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vAbstract
This document contains three papers examining the microstructure of financial interaction
in development and market settings. I first examine the industrial organization of financial
exchanges, specifically limit order markets. In this section, I perform a case study of Google
stock surrounding a surprising earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009, uncover-
ing parameters that describe information flows and liquidity provision. I then explore the
disbursement process for community-driven development projects. This section is game theo-
retic in nature, using a novel three-player ultimatum structure. I finally develop econometric
tools to simulate equilibrium and identify equilibrium models in limit order markets.
In chapter two, I estimate an equilibrium model using limit order data, finding parameters
that describe information and liquidity preferences for trading. As a case study, I estimate
the model for Google stock surrounding an unexpected good-news earnings announcement
in the 3rd quarter of 2009. I find a substantial decrease in asymmetric information prior to
the earnings announcement. I also simulate counterfactual dealer markets and find empiri-
cal evidence that limit order markets perform more efficiently than do their dealer market
counterparts.
In chapter three, I examine Community-Driven Development. Community-Driven De-
velopment is considered a tool empowering communities to develop their own aid projects.
While evidence has been mixed as to the effectiveness of CDD in achieving disbursement
to intended beneficiaries, the literature maintains that local elites generally take control of
most programs. I present a three player ultimatum game which describes a potential de-
centralized aid procurement process. Players successively split a dollar in aid money, and
the final player–the targeted community member–decides between whistle blowing or not.
Despite the elite capture present in my model, I find conditions under which money reaches
vi
targeted recipients. My results describe a perverse possibility in the decentralized aid process
which could make detection of elite capture more difficult than previously considered. These
processes may reconcile recent empirical work claiming effectiveness of the decentralized aid
process with case studies which claim otherwise.
In chapter four, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means to
estimate model parameters in the case study in chapter two. I describe the liquidity supplier
problem and equilibrium among those suppliers. I then outline the analytical forms for
computing certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader. Following this, I describe
a recursive algorithm which facilitates computing equilibrium in supply curves. Finally, I
outline implementation of the Method of Simulated Moments in this context, focusing on
Indirect Inference and formulating the pseudo model.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the 1990s, there have been many changes to equities markets and to development aid
practices. Historically, equities markets were once centralized, relying on specialists in the
New York Stock Exchange, and market makers on NASDAQ, to intermediate the market.
Similarly, the World Bank and related donors have carried out aid projects using top-down
strategies. Projects were developed, funded, and implemented under donor or World Bank
direction. However, mainstay exchanges have fractured, with liquidity going to other ex-
changes, internalizers, and dark pools (Duffie (2012)), while exchanges are computer-driven
more than ever. Community-Driven Development now accounts for a large portion of aid,
offering project development and implementation choices to in-need communities themselves
(Lessmann and Markwardt (2010)). The 1990s saw decentralization take hold in many de-
velopment practices and nearly all financial markets. In this thesis, I develop microeconomic
and econometric theory to explain interesting patterns in data concerning Community-Driven
Development and modern exchanges. In chapter 2, I quantify information asymmetry and
efficiency in modern limit order markets. In chapter 3, I set up a three-person ultimatum
game and find equilibrium that explains interesting outcomes in decentralized development.
In chapter 4, I develop the computational and econometric tools which are necessary for
estimating equilibrium in limit order markets.
21.1 Chapter 2: Beyond the Bid-Ask Spread
In this chapter I explore the microstructure of limit order markets empirically. Empirical
market microstructure has remained primarily in reduced form estimation. Contrasting
with previous studies, I fit parameters using an equilibrium model and explore the industrial
organization of these markets. Through a novel inference method, as outlined in Chapter
4, I quantify anticipated information flow and efficiency in a market for a single asset.
Information flow is in terms of new information about the asset’s underlying value. Efficiency
is characterized as the level of hedging need of traders that the market meets.
I empoy my methodology with a case study involving Google stock surrounding an earn-
ings announcement in the third quarter of 2009. I evaluate typical asymmetry measures,
specifically depth of book and bid-ask spread. To better communicate my own estimation
results, I develop a volume-insensitive measure of information flow into the market, the In-
formedness Ratio. The Informedness Ratio is defined as the ratio of volatility of the asset’s
true value from the perspective of the market and the perspective of some better-informed
trader. A higher number relates to higher asymmetry, which is found at the beginning and
the end of the trading day. As a robustness check, the interday levels of the Informedness
Ratio appear to fall following the earnings announcement, similar to the bid-ask spread.
I also look at efficiency in the market for Google surrounding the earnings announcement.
Employing the structural nature of the model, I can vary model parameters and simulate
data to match it. I vary the number of effective liquidity suppliers in the market at any
one point of time–essentially changing the market structure. From this simulated data, I
compute certainty-equivalent utilites for traders and better-informed traders to illustrate,
as one would expect, that more competition in the market results in higher efficiency. The
model fits for various numbers of effective liquidity providers is also found, and I find that
the model fits markedly better with a larger number of liquidity providers than two. Two
liquidity providers may illustrate a duopolist setting, and so we argue that the market for
Google behaves as if there is more competition among those making the market.
31.2 Chapter 3: Corruption and CDD
I use microeconomic theory to further our understanding of corruption and development.
Development on the whole is understood to attract corruption. Community-Driven De-
velopment, a newer aid implementation, was designed to reduce corruption, and empower
communities to develop their own aid projects. I argue that the way we think about corrup-
tion in development, and specifically Community-Driven Development, may not be accurate.
Classically, considering corruption in a Becker and Stigler (1974) framework, a third party to
corruption serves as deterrent factor. However, such third parties are difficult to characterize
in many aid settings, and incentives facing those perpetrating graft lead corrupt individuals
to choose projects which may best hide their corrupt dealings (Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).
In a tradition of three-person ultimatum games, I present a new three player ultimatum
game which describes a potential decentralized aid procurement process. Players successively
split a dollar in aid money, and the final player–the targeted community member–decides
between whistle blowing or not. I feel as though this setting may more accurately describe
the settings as faced by project implementers as well as village members. The key feature
exploited here is that of a less engaged monitoring entity. The comparative statics I find
lend some light to possible directions for theoretical as well as empirical research into the
economics of decentralized aid and corruption in a decentralized setting.
1.3 Chapter 4: Econometrics and Computation
In my concluding chapter, I develop in more depth the empirical and computational means
to estimate model parameters in the case study in Chapter 2. While the setting I apply these
techniques to is specifically market microstructure and in particular, limit order markets, the
applications for such methods are wider in scope. Competition in supply curves is a notion
explored in auctions and other parts of industrial organization. Similarly, the econometric
tools used here are standard to empirical industrial organization and structural estimation,
4however the way I implement them is different than previously explored.
I set up the model I use for estimating equilibrium trading in limit order markets. While
this analysis leaves out many of the details of the competing liquidity suppliers problem in a
discrete-price order book, the equilibrium concepts are standard. I first describe the liquidity
supplier problem, incorporating the discrete-price first-order and boundary conditions for the
informed active trader. I also find the equilibrium conditions among these suppliers.
I also develop computational tools to find efficiency in the market for an asset. These
utilities are used when analyzing simulated data from varying numbers of effective liquidity
suppliers in my paper. However, the structural methodology allows for any number of
parametric changes, from trader risk-aversion to the volatility of the asset’s underlying value.
The most important methodological piece to analysis of limit order markets is the method
of computing equilibrium in supply curves in a discrete-price setting. Following Baruch
(2008), it is possible to find a partial differential equation which characterizes equilibrium
supply in a continuous-price setting. However, in discrete prices, the equilibrium problem be-
comes more difficult, and analytially intractable. To circumnavigate ths difficulty, I develop
a recursive algorithm which facilitates computation of equilibrium supply curves. The recur-
sive algorithm employs some key features of limit order markets–any market with competing
suppliers, for that matter–and allows for implementation of standard dynamic programming
numerical methods.
The particular nature of limit order data lends itself well to time-series analysis, but
the limited depth in order books (ticks beyond the bid-ask spread), and the decreasing
importance of this depth, reduces the applicability of some standard panel asymptotics.
Because the analytical forms of my equilibrium supply curves are not available, I turn to
the method of simulated moments. Beyond that, the method of simulated moments requires
the use of a pseudo model to avoid the intractable equilibrium supply curves, and produce
moments. I use Indirect Inference to match the pseudo model from data to the pseudo model
from true parameters, and fit using iteration. However, standard Indirect Inference is not
5an option because each instance of the order book lacks panel characteristics necessary for
asymptotic results. I therefore employ the time-series nature of the data, assuming that a
single equilibrium is played over a short period of time, and use in-fill asymptotics to achieve
consistency of my estimator. I then use several instances of the order book to achieve over-
identifying restrictions. By limiting the number of ticks of the order book that are considered
at any point in time, I better represent the true nature of the order book.
6Chapter 2
Beyond the Bid-Ask Spread:
Estimating an Equilibrium Model of
Limit Order Markets
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I study equilibrium trading in limit order markets. Limit order markets are
widely used in financial exchanges around the world, including New York Stock Exchange,
NASDAQ, Stockholm Stock Exchange, and Paris Bourse, among others. A limit order mar-
ket allows for direct interaction between traders, without a market-making dealer. Traders
choose between market orders–which execute against existing orders in the book–and limit
orders–which enter the book with a limit number of shares and limit price and await execu-
tion with a market order. Despite widespread use, empirical studies of limit order markets
have been hampered by data availability and complexity of existing models. This paper
pushes forward the empirical analysis of these markets by specifying and estimating a struc-
tural econometric model of equilibrium trading in a limit order market. As a case study,
I estimate this model on the limit order book for Google stock surrounding a surprisingly
good earnings announcement in the 3rd quarter of 2009.
I develop an econometric framework based on work of Bernhardt and Hughson (1997)
and Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2003), in which the authors study a model of imperfect
competition among liquidity suppliers under adverse selection. My estimation methodology
7incorporates an insight by Baruch (2008), a paper subsumed by Back and Baruch (2012),
that liquidity suppliers’ choice of supply schedules can be recursively characterized as a
dynamic programming problem. This insight is key to my econometric procedure, allowing
me to apply tools and methodologies developed for estimating dynamic optimization models
to the explicitly non-dynamic (static) model of equilibrium in limit order markets. To my
knowledge, this is the first paper performing structural econometric analysis in such a setting.
I use this econometric framework to address two important questions. First, is informa-
tion transmitted evenly and quickly across the market? I present a measure of information
asymmetry, the Informedness Ratio. A higher ratio means that insiders have more infor-
mation than the market, with a lower ratio meaning asymmetry is less. The informedness
ratio is high a day before the examined earnings announcement, settling at a lower level the
day of the announcement, and continuing to fall the day after. The fall in the informedness
ratio the day of the announcement indicates information asymmetry and uncertainty fall
before the announcement is made. Second, what are the welfare implications of the switch
from dealer to limit order markets, pervasive in real-world financial markets? I simulate
counterfactual dealer markets using real data, and show that limit order markets perform as
well as, if not much better than, one would expect dealer markets to perform.
I address an important question in the microstructure literature involving pervasive
change in modern exchanges to a limit order-based system. Historically in most markets,
trade was handled by a single monopolist dealer. If a trader wanted to buy or sell a certain
number of shares, a dealer would quote terms, and the trade could be executed. Now most
exchanges use a limit order book. Traders have the option of placing market orders, which
execute against existing shares in the book, or placing a limit order, with a limit price and
quantity, which enters the book and waits for a market order to execute against it. I use
counterfactual examples to assess the change in market performance moving from two deal-
ers to the imperfect competition found in limit order markets. Arguments could be made
that limit order markets reduce restrictions on offer schedules, improving terms for trade,
8increasing welfare.1 However, a dealer could bring a level of expertise to an asset, allowing
a dealer to facilitate the market in times that decentralized traders would be unwilling to
make a market for an asset. Using my model, I simulate counterfactual dealer markets from
the data. Not surprisingly, more liquidity suppliers leads to higher welfare. As a robustness
check, I find the model fits better with five liquidity suppliers than it does with two or ten–
when traditional markets typically had one, but no more than two, dealers per asset. This
means that the market behaves effectively as if it has five dealers. More dealers unambigu-
ously means higher welfare, hence I conclude that limit order markets are more efficient than
a counterfactual dealer market would be.
I touch on several different literatures related to this work in section 2.2. Section 2.3
explains the limit order book as a dynamic program and the risk-averse active trader setting
used here. Section 2.4 discusses methods of simulation and estimation. I discuss my results
on earnings announcements in section 2.5. In section 2.6, I perform robustness checks of the
model specification and conduct an analysis of the move from dealer markets to limit order
markets. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
I take an equilibrium model of imperfect competition in a common value setting from Bern-
hardt and Hughson (1997), which is further analyzed for equilibrium in Biais, Martimort,
and Rochet (2003)2 and apply it in an empirical setting. Their analysis involves strategic
risk-neutral liquidity suppliers competing in schedules for the business of a risk-averse agent
who is privately informed about the value of the asset and about hedging needs in a com-
mon value setting. Biais et al. extend previous analyses concerning what creates the bid-ask
spread, patterns in trading volumes, and oligopolistic incentives.3
1See Biais, Foucault, and Salanie´ (1998).
2Madhavan (1992) uses the same risk-averse trader setting, but assumes competitive liquidity suppliers.
For a recent model on imperfect competition in a contrasting private value setting, see Vives (2011).
3See Kyle (1985) for the seminal batch-trading model, Glosten (1989) for the monopolist dealer problem,
Glosten (1994) for an early treatment of limit order markets and the limiting case as the number of traders
9Baruch (2008) makes a key analytical insight, by applying dynamic programming meth-
ods to analyze the same model. From an econometric point of view, this insight proves useful
in making these models amenable to estimation. While dynamic programming methods are
inherently valuable to a variety of problems in structural analysis, these methods are often
employed in explicitly dynamic models, where agents make intertemporal decisions. Using
Baruch’s intuition, I can solve for equilibrium price schedules using dynamic programming
methods in price. Dynamic programming has become a crucial component of the structural
econometrics tool box, beginning with Miller (1984), Wolpin (1984), Pakes (1986), and Rust
(1987), and is used to approach a variety of problems. While my model is not explicitly
dynamic, I use similar intuition in finding the equilibrium in a limit order market. By sim-
ulating supply curves from the data, I try to match parameters in the true model to actual
data. This process is the principal of Indirect Inference, as in Gourie´roux, Monfort, and
Renault (1993) and Smith (1993).4
While theory is concerned with microstructure and its implications on liquidity provi-
sion and information transmission, the related empirical literature focuses on reduced-form
analysis of optimal order placement and dynamics between limit orders and market orders.5
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995)6 study the early Paris Bourse computerized limit order ex-
change. They find that thin books elicit more limit orders whereas market depth results
in market orders, or immediate trades.7 Dufour and Engle (2000) use a model to assess
the role of waiting time between transactions in the process of price formation. They find
grows, and Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) for the duopoly case. For related and important models in which
nature chooses whether the trader is an informed trader or a liquidity-motivated trader, see Copeland and
Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Some work has sought to reconcile the two-sided limit order
problem, as in Ros¸u (2009). For a survey of the theoretical literature, see O’Hara (1998), or more recently,
Vives (2010).
4Goettler and Gordon (2011) is a recent application of Indirect Inference in structural estimation.
5For a survey of empirical work, see Hasbrouck (2007).
6Ranaldo (2004) studies similar questions, but using ordered probit to empirically investigate order sub-
mission strategies. The author finds patient traders become more aggressive when their own side of the book
is thicker, when the spread is wider, and when volatility is momentarily high. For an experimental study of
liquidity in an electronic limit order market, see Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar (2005).
7This finding is consistent with modern theoretical and numerical simulation results. See Foucault, Kadan,
and Kandel (2005), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2005), and Pagnotta (2010).
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that as the speed of trades increases, price adjustment also increases, hence an increased
presence of informed traders. Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) study the relationship between
market depth and transitory volatility. They find evidence that limit order traders enter the
market, placing orders where liquidity is needed. This finding is in support of the notion
that a limit order market is in equilibrium at any one point in time, with liquidity suppliers
waiting to fill gaps in the market.
The literature of structural empirical work on limit order markets is smaller. Sand˚as
(2001) present economic restrictions on price schedules offered in a competitive setting. He
finds that there is insufficient depth in limit order books relative to theoretical predictions.
Hollifield, Miller, and Sand˚as (2004)8 examine optimal order placement and find order sub-
mission is a montone function for a trader’s valuation of the asset. However, their model
assumes traders trade only one unit of the asset, and the authors reject their private value
trading restrictions for the order placements of traders with moderate private values. Hol-
lifield, Miller, Sand˚as, and Slive (2006) study the gains from trade in a limit order market,
comparing efficiency in a perfectly liquid market and a market with a monopolist to the
actual gains from trade. Kelley and Tetlock (2012) estimate a model of strategic trader be-
havior that incorporates endogenously informed traders and discretionary liquidity traders.
They show that these discretionary traders make up most trading volume, but that from
2001 to 2010, informed trading increasingly contributes to volume and stock price discovery.
Their analysis exploits variation in trading and volatility correlated with time of day and
public news arrival under a linear pricing equilibrium. I build on the structural estimation
literature by estimating equilibrium trading in a limit order model with endogenous liquidity
provision.
8For an earlier investigation in optimal order strategies, see Harris and Hasbrouck (1996).
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2.3 Model
In limit order markets, traders choose between placing market orders and limit orders. Mar-
ket orders execute against orders in the book at the best price posted, what is called walking
the book, or taking liquidity. Limit orders specify a limit price and quantity, where unexe-
cuted portions of a limit order enter the book, what is called supplying liquidity. The limit
order market allows traders to interact directly. Posting liquidity to the book and taking it
have a timing component however. A market order executes with an order that came before
it. The active trader making the market order may have information newer to the market
than information liquidity suppliers had when offering shares. If this information asymme-
try fully characterized trade, there would be no market (see Milgrom and Stokey (1982),
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)). Instead, active investors have incentives to trade beyond
inside information. An active investor may wish to hedge a position, reducing exposure to
an asset. This balance between opposing motivations is a key tension in information-based
models of limit order markets.
There are n risk-neutral uninformed liquidity suppliers and a single informed active trader
trading a single asset. Liquidity suppliers submit limit orders and the active trader observes
all bids and offers and submits a marketable order. The asset is then liquidated at v = α+ ,
where α, distributed normally, is the signal the informed active trader receives, and  is
noise. I ∼ N(µI , σ2I ) is the informed active trader’s inventory of the asset. Latent supply,
S0 is used for estimation and is described in more detail later. Table 2.1 provides model
paramters and definitions.
Without loss of generality, I focus my discussion on the offer side of the book. Liquidity
suppliers could be viewed as institutional traders, for example, Goldman Sachs, etc. Active
traders could be employees at the traded company who have access to information relevant
to the company’s stock performance that is unavailable to liquidity suppliers. However,
active traders do not only have information motivations for trading, but also non-information
hedging needs based on their current holding of the stock. Liquidity suppliers do not know
12
Table 2.1: Model Parameters
n number of liquidity suppliers
σα standard deviation of informed trader’s signal
σ standard deviation of noise of informed trader’s signal
µI mean of the distribution of the informed trader’s inventory of the asset
σI standard deviation of the distribution of the informed trader’s inventory
σS0 standard deviation of latent supply
whether a market order posted by an active trader arises from information or liquidity
motivations. This information asymmetry between the active trader and liquidity suppliers
is a source of adverse selection in the model. Generally, hedging-motivated trades would be
profitable for the liquidity suppliers, but information-based trades would not. Thus, liquidity
suppliers face adverse selection in deciding how many shares to supply at any one price.
Higher information asymmetry will make liquidity suppliers wary, and they will respond by
posting fewer shares. Less information asymmetry means more liquidity will be available
and more hedging needs will be met.
2.3.1 Notation
Liquidity suppliers play a static game. To accommodate the data, I take prices as discrete.
pask is the minimum price at which liquidity is offered and pmax is the maximum, hence prices
are pask ≡ p1, . . . , pM ≡ pmax, and are taken as given. A strategy for the ith liquidity supplier
is Si : {p1, . . . , pM} → R where Sir ≡ Si(pr) represents the total number of shares offered by
i through price pr. The limit order book changes rapidly within a short period of time. At
the lowest price, p1, I assume there is some additional, latent supply, S0, which represents
impatient trades, hidden orders, or spillover from the buy side of the market. While this
does not change implications of the model, it is important for econometric implementation,
as it generates variation in the limit order book across trading episodes.9 Because the set
9For a detailed discussion of latent supply, see the equilibrium solution section of the appendix, 4.4.
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of prices is discrete, the function sir ≡ Sir − Sir−1 is well defined. I also define s−ir ≡
∑
j 6=i sjr,
Sr ≡ ∑i=1,...,n Sir + S0, and sr ≡ ∑i=1,...,n sir.
In this common value environment, profitability of a limit order is dependent on prob-
ability of execution and the expected value of selling the asset conditional on execution. If
marketable, the active trader’s bid walks up the book, picking off offers until it reaches its
limit price or is filled. Private information observed by the active trader leads to adverse
selection. Profitability of a liquidity supplier’s offer at a price pr is a function of that price,
liquidity offered up to that price by all liquidity suppliers, liquidity offered at that price by
the agent, and liquidity offered at that price by all other liquidity suppliers.
2.3.2 Dynamic Programming Characterization of the Limit Order
Book
Because a single trader’s order walks up the book, I can treat the limit order book, which
consists in equilibrium, of the liquidity suppliers optimally chosen supply schedules, as the
solution to a dynamic programming problem in price. This is a key insight of Baruch (2008).
While profitability of shares offered at a lower price affects profitability of shares offered at
a higher price, profitability of shares offered at lower prices are unaffected by shares offered
at higher prices, hence at the price pr, I define the value function,
VL(pr, Sr−1) = max
sim, m=r,...,M
M∑
m=r
uL(pm, Sm−1, sim, s−im ) (2.1)
such that
Sm+1 = Sm + sim + s−im (2.2)
Here uL(pr, Sr−1, sir, s−ir ) represents profitability to the liquidity supplier.10 The state vari-
able is Sr−1, the total volume supplied at prices lower than the current price, pr. The
10The form of profitability is described later in section 2.3.4 and appendix 4.2.
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corresponding Bellman equation is,
VL(pr, qr) = max
sir
[uL(pr, Sr−1, sir, s−ir ) + VL(pr+1, Sr−1 + sir + s−ir )] (2.3)
This recursively characterizes the optimal supply schedule {si∗1 , si∗2 , . . . , si∗M}. At maximal
price pM , the Bellman equation simplifies to
VL(pM , SM−1) = max
siM
uL(pM , SM−1, siM , s−iM ) (2.4)
For all values of SM−1, I can solve for si∗M at the maximal price. Plugging in this strategy to
the Bellman equation at pM−1, the strategy si∗M−1 satisfies,
VL(pM−1, SM−2) = max
siM−1
[uL(pM−1, SM−2, siM−1, s−iM−1)+VL(pM , SM−2+siM−1+s−iM−1+si∗M+s−i∗M )]
(2.5)
Given the finiteness of prices, this dynamic programming problem can be solved for si∗ ≡
{si∗1 , si∗2 , . . . , , si∗M} by backward induction, starting at the highest price pM .
2.3.3 Risk Averse Active Trader
In this paper I use a setting with a risk averse, informed trader facing risk neutral, uninformed
liquidity suppliers, found in many papers, namely Glosten (1989) for the monopolist dealer
setting, Madhavan (1992) for a competitive setting, Bernhardt and Hughson (1997) for
duopoly, and Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2003) for the further oligopoly setting. In this
setting, active traders placing market orders bring new information to the market and are
informed. Liquidity suppliers, however, have orders already in the book when a market order
is placed, and are uninformed. As in Copeland and Galai (1983), active traders coming to the
market–after limit orders are already posted–bring information to the market that liquidity
suppliers do not yet have.
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The active trader sees a signal, α, where v = α +  and  is normally distributed with
mean 0 and standard deviation σ. In addition, the active trader has inventory of the asset
I and knows this. The active trader uses this information to decide an optimal order, q,
maximizing the expectation of the utility of wealth, where
uA(q|I, α) ≡ −e−γW , (2.6)
W ≡ (q + I)v︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of shares owned
−
M∑
r=0
max{0,min{q, Sr} − Sr−1}pr︸ ︷︷ ︸
payment to suppliers
,11 (2.7)
and γ is the coefficient of risk aversion. The active trader does not observe v directly, but
receives a noisy signal α. A large α means that the underlying asset’s value is likely high,
and the active trader’s order will walk the book picking off stale asks. Conversely, if I is
large and positive, the active trader wants to sell, and when I is large and negative, the
active trader wants to buy. The active trader is incentivized by α and I, so a high α (news)
may mean buying even when I (exposure) is also high. The uninformed risk neutral liquidity
suppliers know the distribution of α ∼ N(µα, σα) and I ∼ N(µI , σI), but a liquidity supplier
can only infer a posterior distribution on (α, I) from trades.
For illustration purposes, I first consider the case where prices are continuous. A supplier
posts an offer to sell at a price and an informed active trader’s buy order walks the book,
picking off these shares. Following rational expectations, the seller must exhibit no regret
in selling shares to the profile of traders that bought them. In Figure 2.1, a supply schedule
generates a purchase choice of q∗ shares. The optimal choice by the active trader is the
intersection of supply and incentives to buy shares, α−price
γσ2
− I. Given that γσ2 is common
knowledge, the supplier knows the slope of this curve, and can back out the intercept,
revealing the profile of active traders (α, I). The liquidity supplier considers the profile of
11For ease of notation, and following the definition of latent supply, p0 = p1.
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traders who would buy at a given price and quantity and responds with the optimal number
of shares.12
Figure 2.1: Inference and Continuous Solution
Total payment
price
shares
supply
q∗
T ′(q∗)
α
γσ2
− I
α− price
γσ2
− I
To put it more formally, liquidity suppliers compete in transfer schedules T (·) : R+ → R+
giving the payment for any quantity, q, demanded by an active trader. As a result, the
active trader chooses q maximizing E[−e−γW ], from (2.6). This is equivalent to maximizing
E[W |α, I] + γ2V [W |α, I]. Variance of holdings is (q + I)2σ2 . From transfer schedules this is
equal to, (q+ I)α− T (q)− γ2 (q+ I)2σ2 . This yields an interior solution for supply schedules
where q∗ = α−T ′(q∗)
γσ2
− I. Here the supply curve in Figure 2.1 is T ′(q), and T ′(q∗) is simply
the price at which the last portion of q∗ is supplied.
In typical data, supply schedules are not continuous functions of price, but rather
step functions. This introduces complications to the model, as I show here.13 Solving
12This reasoning is similar to strategies conditional on winning the prize in auctions (see Milgrom and
Weber (1982)), and vote pivotality in juries (see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)). The liquidity supplier
must offer enough shares to take advantage of the hedging needs of traders reaching that far in the book
while balancing information asymmetry faced at that point as well.
13A treatment of price discreteness for bidding in multiunit auctions is found in Kastl (2006), McAdams
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for equilibrium q, the best response quantity demanded by an active trader when utility
is u(q|α, I) ≡ −e−γW , is again equivalent to the active trader choosing a q maximizing
E[W |α, I] + γ2V [W |α, I]. Wealth is given by equation 2.7, and the trader maximizes,
(q + I)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected value of shares
−
M∑
r=0
max{0,min{q, Sr} − Sr−1}pr︸ ︷︷ ︸
payment to suppliers
− γ2 (q + I)
2σ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
volatility penalty
. (2.8)
In equation 2.8, v in wealth as in equation 2.7 is replaced by α, because σ is expectation
0. However, σ shows up in the risk aversion variance of wealth penalty. Because of the
discrete nature of these supply curves, either the active trader reaches a first order condition,
at some point between Sr and Sr+1 for some r, or not, at Sr+1 for some r. In the first
case, α − pm − γ2σ2 (2q + 2I) = 0, where pr is s.t. Sr < q < Sr+1. In the second, the
first order condition is not reached, and q = Sr+1 s.t. α − pr − γ2σ2 (2q + 2I) > 0 and
α − pr+1 − γ2σ2 (2q + 2I) < 0, hence the active trader has exhausted all gains from trade at
price pr, but would lose money trading at pr+1 for the next available liquidity in the book.
The two cases are as follows,
Case 1: interior solution, where pr is s.t. Sr−1 < q < Sr
q = α− pr
γσ2
− I (2.9)
As can be seen, given a supply schedule and an active trader places an order, liquidity
suppliers can infer a statistic, α
γσ2
− I, for α and I which contains all the information the
liquidity suppliers can infer about α and I.
Case 2: boundary solution, q = Sr
α− pr+1
γσ2
− I < q < α− pr
γσ2
− I (2.10)
However, if q∗ = Sr for some r, then inference is not as clear for the liquidity suppliers.
(2008), and Hortac¸su and Kastl (2012).
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Figure 2.2: Inference and Interior Solution
Total payment
price
shares
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
S3
supply
α
γσ2
− I
α− price
γσ2
− I
q∗
Now, α
γσ2
− I can only be narrowed down to a range of profiles.
2.3.4 Liquidity Suppliers and the Optimal Supply Problem
I assume that offers at a given price are executed proportionally.14 This means that at price
pr, the bid walks through the orders at a rate s
i
r
sir+s−ir
for each supplier i until the order moves
up the book to the next price. With these solutions I compute the utility of offering shares
for the liquidity supplier at each price pr, which is expected profitability given liquidity
suppliers are risk-neutral. Either q > Sr−1 + sir + s−ir or Sr−1 < q ≤ Sr−1 + sir + s−ir .
uL(pr, Sr−1, sir, s−ir ) =
Eα,,I
[
sir1{Sr−1+sir+s−ir ≤q}(pr − v) +
sir
sir + s−ir
(q − Sr−1)1{Sr−1<q<Sr−1+sir+s−ir }(pr − v)
]
(2.11)
14Because the model used here is not explicitly dynamic, assuming that some orders are executed after
others would negate non-trivial symmetric equilibrium and likely would make the number of equilibria
infinite.
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Figure 2.3: Inference and Boundary Solution
Total payment
price
shares
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
supply
q∗ = S3
α
γσ2
− I
α− price
γσ2
− I
The expected profit is added to the continuation payoff for subsequent prices. For each
number of shares offered, there is an expected profit for that price, and an expected payoff
for subsequent supply. I consider a symmetric equilibrium for liquidity suppliers when the
derivative of this expected profit with the derivative of continuation is 0.15 I leave further
derivation to the appendix, 4.2.
2.4 Estimation
Here I describe my econometric method in which I use a nested fixed point algorithm, as
in Rust (1987)16. Starting with parameter values of the structural model, I find equilibrium
supply curves. Using a pseudo-model17 (following the terminology in Gourie´roux, Monfort,
15While Back and Baruch (2012) show equilibrium theoretically for only a range of parameter values, I
verify the equilibrium numerically.
16See Rust (1994) and Rust (1996) for further discussion.
17The pseudo-model is referred to as an approximated model, an instrumental model, and a statistical model
by the literature. For clarity, I will use the term pseudo-model from here on.
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and Renault (1993)), I fit the generated supply curves to those found in the data. Choosing
new parameter values, I iterate until I achieve a best fit. This is illustrated in Figure 2.4,
below. In addition, the following sections describe the individual components of this analysis.
Figure 2.4: Indirect Inference
True Model: θ0
Data: S1, p1, . . . , SM , pM
Pseudo Supply
Curve: S(βˆ, p)
Hypothesized θ˜
Simulate:
S˜1, p1, . . . , S˜M , pM
Pseudo Simulated Supply
Curve: S(β˜, p)
βˆ = β˜
θ0 = θ˜
2.4.1 Solving for Equilibrium
Players compete in supply schedules at each price successively, as liquidity at lower prices
affects the profitability of liquidity supplied later. In the optimal Markov strategy, liquidity
suppliers’ offers of shares at a given price are based soley on the amount of liquidity offered
up to that point.18 Suppliers consider a trade executing against their supply schedule. The
market order picks off shares at prices at which liquidity is offered, until the order is met. A
liquidity supplier infers what profile of information and liquidity incentives were faced given
the trade reached that deep in the book, and decides how many shares to offer at that price.
Suppliers determine their strategies starting at the limit of economically meaningful share
depth and backward induct to find their optimal supply curves.
For interested readers, solving for equilibrium is described in detail in the appendix, 4.4.
18Given the nature of modeling competition in supply, if an optimal strategy exists for this problem, then
a Markov optimal strategy exists.
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2.4.2 Indirect Inference
For estimating model parameters, I use the simulated method of Indirect Inference, following
seminal work in Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Renault (1993), and Smith (1993).19 I estimate a
pseudo-model for data and limit order supply curves simulated from the model. Realizing a
best fit of the model means generating estimates as close together as possible. I find the set
of parameters such that the pseudo-model’s two sets of estimations coincide.20 Coefficients
of the pseudo-model consist of a least squares regression of share quantities on four linear
and nonlinear functions of price.
Let βˆ denote parameters of the pseudo-model estimated from actual data. Analogously,
let β˜λ(θ) denote parameters estimated from data simulated from the limit order book under
parameters θ (λ superscripts the specific simulation). The Indirect Inference estimator θˆΛ 21
optimizes the following criterion,
θˆΛ ≡ arg min
θ∈Θ
βˆ − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ(θ)
′Ω
βˆ − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ(θ)
 (2.12)
I explain details of the Indirect Inference method, demonstrate asymptotic normality of
the estimator, and also prove the following proposition in the appendix, 4.5,
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1–6, θˆΛ is a consistent estimator of θ0.
19See Goettler and Gordon (2011) for another recent use of Indirect Inference for estimating equilibrium
of a structural model.
20For all estimates, I try different starting values for the parameter search algorithm. In most cases,
the outcomes for the model parameters are the same. When different starting values produced different
parameter estimates, I chose the model parameters that led to the lowest criterion function values.
21Λ signifies the number of simulated supply curves analyzed by the pseudo-model. In this paper, I use
200 simulations for each criterion calculation.
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2.5 Empirical Results: A Snapshot of Google, October
14-16, 2009
In this section I estimate the model. I examine the limit order book for Google stock (trading
on NASDAQ), using nine episodes bracketing the 2009 third quarter earnings announcement
by Google. Each episode includes a series of observations of the limit order book, characteriz-
ing equilibrium in the limit order market at the time of the episode. Each set of observations
are grouped together to form estimates of the model. I obtain a picture of how information
asymmetry evolved before and after the announcement.
2.5.1 Earnings Announcements, Asymmetric Information
Earnings announcements convey meaningful information about a company. Markets price an
asset consistently with market expectations, but the true profits and losses a company realizes
over the quarter may shift these expectations, causing jumps in asset prices. Trading on this
information could be very profitable and insiders trading on information could undermine
the market. Leading up to an earnings announcement, a Google employee, for example an
upper level manager, who may be a significant Google shareholder, could have information
about the announcement not yet known to the market. Uninformed institutional traders
offer liquidity to this Google employee, keeping in mind that the employee may be trading
based on liquidity preferences, e.g., reducing exposure to the asset, or inside information. If
institutional traders anticipate heavy information trading, depth of the book will be shallow.
However, if they anticipate liquidity trading, supply schedules will become steeper and more
depth will fill the book.
There is an important literature studying returns and markets surrounding earnings
announcements. Linnainmaa (2010) shows that using limit orders changes the inferences one
can make about trading intentions. Examining several regularly identified investor trading
patterns, he shows that most of these observed effects are due to the use of limit orders,
23
and that much of the inferences about investors’ trading abilities are due to limit orders’
exposure to adverse selection risk. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004) use NASDAQ data
to examine short-selling prior to earnings announcements, and find a significant link between
abnormal short-sales and post-announcement stock returns.22 Similarly, Kaniel, Liu, Saar,
and Titman (2012) consider large individual investor buys and sells on the New York Stock
Exchange, and show corresponding abnormal returns following earnings announcements.23
While these studies analyze price movements and trading volumes, as indirect evidence of
information leakage, I use my structural model to directly quantify changes in information
asymmetry surrounding an earnings announcement. As I show below, the implications of my
results differ from implications one might draw from analyzing price movements and trading
volume.
On Thursday, October 15, 2009, Google closed on NASDAQ at $530, well below the
Wednesday close of $535.50. That afternoon, then CEO Eric Schmidt made the 3rd quarter
earnings announcement, remarking,
Google had a strong quarter–I saw 7% year-over-year revenue growth despite the
tough economic conditions. While there is a lot of uncertainty about the pace of
economic recovery, I believe the worst of the recession is behind us and now feel
confident about investing heavily in the future.24
This was apparently a positive shock to the market; the stock reopened at $546.50 on Friday,
Oct. 16, eventually closing at $550, while market returns were flat these days. Next, I
22Ball and Brown (1968) were the first to note the link between abnormal returns and unexpected earnings
announcements. Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin (1984) replicated these findings regarding abnormal returns,
uncovering similar market inefficiencies. Bernard and Thomas (1989) and Bernard and Thomas (1990)
show support of the hypothesis of price response delay, rejecting that capital asset pricing systematically
underestimates (overestimates) risk surrounding good (bad) news.
23Lee (1992) were early to find patterns regarding strategies of large and small investors. Bartov, Rad-
hakrishnan, and Krinsky (2000), and Bhattacharya (2001) find that investor sophistication is negatively cor-
related with abnormal returns–investors with less sophistication underestimate the implications of a surprise
earnings announcement. Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) show that investors making large trades respond
to earnings forecast errors, while investors making small trades respond to a less-sophisticated signal. See
Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, and Teoh (2008) for contrasting analysis.
24http://investor.google.com/pdf/2009Q3_earnings_google.pdf
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examine this through the lens of the structural estimates from my equilibrium limit order
model.
2.5.2 Estimation Results
I estimate the model on three days surrounding the announcement. The earnings announce-
ment was made 4:30 p.m. EST, Oct. 15, a half-hour after the market closed, and estimates
are taken from Oct. 14, 15, and 16, early, midday, and late during trading hours. I charac-
terize information asymmetries and liquidity motivations for trading at each point in time.
Before turning to my structural estimates, I consider typical measures of information
asymmetry; specifically, I look at the bid-ask spread and the amount of shares offered in the
order book. Figure 2.5 shows an overall downward trend in bid-ask spreads in this three
day period, with a spike in spread in the middle of the day following the announcement,
consistent with Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993).25 This hints at an overall reduction in
information asymmetry during this period. Similarly, Figure 2.5 demonstrates the amount
of shares in the first five ticks of the market are low early in the day, high late.
Next I turn to my structural estimates. Results and definitions of terms can be found in
Table 2.2. The level of µI changes a great deal over this period of time, being lower (and
negative, so greater in absolute magnitude, and more hedging preferences for trade) later
in the day than earlier, with a peak (and therefore less liquidity preferences for trade) in
the middle of the day. However, σα changes rapidly, and beginning Oct.14, σ is gradually
increasing. As σα falls and σ rises, the ratio of σα to σ decreases, hence, asymmetric
information drops significantly. Information asymmetry drops from Oct. 14 to Oct. 15,
continuing to fall later on Oct. 15–as evidenced by the increased hedging incentive revealed
in the market at that time in the day. I see this asymmetry fall again on Oct. 16, with a
lower point in the middle of the trading day.
25Lee, Mucklow, and Ready (1993) show that liquidity providers are sensitive to changes in information
asymmetry risk and use both spreads and depths to actively manage this risk.
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Table 2.2: Earnings Announcements Results
This table shows fitted parameters of the true model for the sell side of the Google limit order
book surrounding its 3rd quarter earnings announcement, made 4:30 p.m. EST, October 15,
2009. Parameters are estimated from the first five ticks of the book in a set of three samples, one
on each side of a time of day, where samples are separated by 15 minutes. The dates and times
chosen are early, midday and late on October 14, 15, and 16. Market open at 9 a.m., each early
estimate is taken at 10:00 a.m., EST, unless otherwise specified, midday, 1:00 p.m., and late,
3:30 p.m., market closing at 4 p.m. σα is the standard deviation of the informed trader’s signal
about the asset’s true value, and σ is the standard deviation of the white noise around the
informed trader’s signal, both in $. µI and σI are the mean and variance of the inventory of the
informed trader, in shares of Google stock. σS0 is the standard deviation of a calibration variable
representing hidden orders and impatient sellers, in shares of Google. Bootstrap standard errors
in parentheses.
Date-Time σα σa µI σI σS0
10/14 early 0.7260 0.0415 -700.106 199.806 20.927
(0.0076) (0.0005) (2.9226) (6.8451) (3.2822)
10/14 mid 0.3367 0.0306 -401.749 111.887 20.005
(0.0066) (0.0020) (5.247) (3.454) (0.2524)
10/14 late 0.5720 0.0216 -1598.362 561.992 19.407
(0.0013) (0.00004) (2.352) (2.667) (0.2983)
10/15 early 0.4375 0.0254 -947.812 148.192 12.030
(0.0009) (0.00009) (0.5244) (3.454) (0.0154)
10/15 mid 0.4274 0.0339 -736.098 230.567 19.861
(0.0026) (0.0001) (2.963) (3.452) (0.1252)
10/15 late 0.4571 0.0284 -2169.115 275.685 20.300
(0.0058) (0.0002) (34.372) (13.408) (1.1364)
10/16 earlyb 0.6871 0.0481 -912.498 81.159 8.0851
(0.0006) (0.00003) (0.1377) (0.3464) (0.0077)
10/16 mid 0.3855 0.0445 -704.534 253.961 20.851
(0.0177) (0.0011) (9.602) (17.688) (0.3929)
10/16 late 0.2933 0.0204 -2376.286 725.681 20.496
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Nc 51 – – – –
Sd 200 – – – –
a The coefficient of risk aversion, γ never stands alone, meaning that it is estimated directly with σ. I
assume γ = 1 and show estimates for σ. b This time was offset by a total of two (2) fifteen minute periods
to 10:30 a.m.. The bid-ask spread was too wide to produce meaningful estimates, and I waited until a point
in the day that the market was back in equilibrium. c For each set of estimates I take 3 samples. Each
sample has a number of instances of the order book. This is the sample size. d I use simulations to fit data.
I take a certain number of draws of latent supply and find the associated supply curves.
26
Figure 2.5: Bid-Ask Spread and Depth
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2.5.3 Informedness Ratio
To summarize the implications of parameter estimates on the extent of information asym-
metry and adverse selection, I introduce the informedness ratio. The informedness ratio is
defined as the ratio of the standard deviations of the asset value from the liquidity suppliers’
perspective and the active trader’s perspective. The active trader receives a signal about the
asset’s true value and the liquidity suppliers do not. Therefore, the ratio is simply the ratio
of the standard deviation of the true value from its expectation, and the standard deviation
of the white noise the active trader faces in the signal, which is a natural measure of how
much less informed the liquidity suppliers are compared to the active trader. The true value
of the asset is v = α+ ; assuming that the signal α is not correlated with white noise , the
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informedness ratio is defined as,
σv
σ
=
√
σ2α + σ2
σ
≡ Informedness Ratio26 (2.13)
The informedness ratio has no absolute cardinal meaning. However, a higher value may
be indicative of large asymmetry in information or a preponderance of information trading,
while a lower value indicates more liquidity-motivated trading and hence, less information
asymmetry.
The informedness ratio from my results is plotted in Figure 2.6. There is a pronounced
downward trend in the informedness ratio over the three day period, implying a reduction in
information asymmetry. The informedness ratio is rather high late on Oct. 14. It falls steeply
by Oct. 15, settling around 17 that day. This shows that the market responded to asymmetry
that is reduced the day of the earnings announcement. Whatever information traders were
ready to trade on, prior to the earnings announcement, the market is no longer responding to
it once the earnings announcement is made. However, this information asymmetry dissipates
further, as evidenced by continued decline in the informedness ratio the day after the earnings
announcement is made. It reaches 14 and then 8 after being double that the day before.
This plot indicates that the market behaves as if active traders were better informed
(relative to uninformed liquidity suppliers) the day before the announcement, and that this
informedness dissipated by the day of the announcement. The fall in the informedness ratio
between Oct. 14 late and Oct. 15 early contrasts with the trend in the bid-ask spread,
which peaked during Oct. 15 early, as shown in Figure 2.5. Overall, the downward trend
in the informedness ratio corroborates a similar trend in the bid-ask spread, however, the
informedness ratio implies that the decline in information asymmetry began earlier.
26The coefficient of risk aversion, γ never stands alone, meaning that it is estimated directly with σ. I
assume γ = 1 and show estimates for σ.
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Figure 2.6: Informedness Ratio
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2.6 Robustness Checks: Levels of Competition
In limit order data, individual-level order placement goes unobserved. However, the model
specifies a number of traders. I estimate the model using n = 5, a choice resulting from a
specification search over different values of n.
2.6.1 Comparison of Fit
I show that the market behaves as if there are more liquidity suppliers than two and fewer
than ten. If the model were to fit well with n = 5 liquidity suppliers, and not as well with
n = 2 or n = 10, this would be evidence the market behaves as if there are effectively five
liquidity suppliers competing for the business of active traders. Model fit and estimates for
n = 2, n = 5, and n = 10 are compared in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Robustness Checks
This table shows comparative fitted parameters of the true model for market structures with
two, five, and ten liquidity suppliers for the sell side of the Google limit order book surrounding
its 3rd quarter earnings announcement, made 4:30 p.m. EST, October 15, 2009. The market for
Google opens at 9 a.m., EST, and unless otherwise noted, early refers 10:00 a.m., mid refers to
1:00 p.m., and late refers to estimates being made for data at 3:30 p.m., market closing at 4:00
p.m. σα is the standard deviation of the informed trader’s signal about the asset’s true value,
and σ is the standard deviation of the white noise around the informed trader’s signal, both in
$. µI and σI are the mean and variance of the inventory of the informed trader, in shares of
Google stock, where greater magnitude means more liquidity preferences. σS0 is the standard
deviation of a calibration variable representing hidden orders and impatient sellers, in shares
of Google. Fit shows the mean-squared error of the estimates, and a lower number is a better
fit. The model fits better with number of liquidity suppliers being five rather than two, hence
markets behave as if they have five dealers, as opposed to two. This is evidence that modern
limit order markets are more efficient than hypothetical dealer markets–characterized by one,
or maybe two dealers–would be. Standard errors in parentheses.
σα σ µI σI σS0
n fit
10/14 late 2 52,244.2 0.4253 0.0391 -2633.938 814.957 20.607
5 7651.4 0.5720 0.0216 -1598.362 561.992 19.407
10 10,863.5 0.2794 0.0227 -527.943 176.344 17.314
10/15 early 2 214.0 0.3754 0.0579 -1454.298 415.548 20.388
5 6.0 0.4375 0.0254 -947.812 148.192 12.030
10 55.4 0.6434 0.0698 -285.119 190.829 22.548
10/15 mid 2 6296.4.8 0.3608 0.0436 -1853.380 542.495 20.210
5 90.0 0.4274 0.0339 -736.098 230.567 19.861
10 367.5 0.3772 0.0327 -366.799 105.985 20.116
10/15 late 2 95,737.8 0.2632 0.0209 -2193.646 265.143 20.225
5 83.9 0.4571 0.0284 -2169.115 275.685 20.300
10 297.5 0.1925 0.0433 -692.216 294.226 20.538
10/16 earlya 2 9631.1 0.4286 0.0424 -2361.003 683.236 20.436
5 687.7 0.6871 0.0481 -912.431 80.932 8.004
10 581.4 0.2484 0.0214 -463.436 137.343 19.778
a This time was offset by a total of two (2) fifteen minute periods to 10:30 a.m.. The bid-ask spread was too wide
to produce meaningful estimates, and I waited until a point in the day that the market was back in equilibrium.
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Table 2.3 contains fitted θs for five dates and times examined earlier. I also include θs
for n = 2 and n = 10 to contrast specification fits. The model fits are better in four of the
five dates and times. Market data is fitted by the model consistently better for n = 5 over
n = 2 with only one instance of a fit worse than n = 10.
2.6.2 Comparing Limit Order Markets and Dealer Markets
The model I estimate fits better with n = 5 than it does with n = 2 or n = 10. Looking at
n = 2, corresponds to estimating a dealer market. I investigate the change in welfare moving
from dealer to limit order markets. Historically, NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange, and
others, depended on dealers or market makers to facilitate the market for an asset. More
recently, modern markets have employed a direct trading scheme in the form of a limit order
market. In dealer markets, traders never directly interact. Instead, a trader would make
known to a dealer that she was interested in selling shares of a stock. The dealer would post
terms for trade, and the trader would sell as much as she wished according to those terms.
The dealer would then sell those shares on the other side of the market. This way a trader
could always trade and never had to wait for terms to be met as long as the dealer was there
to take the other side of any transaction. Limit order markets are centralized, but trade
need not go through a single intermediary.
While the move from dealer markets to limit order markets is pervasive, it is not clear
they are better in terms of welfare. It may be the case that while limit order markets bypass
the middleman, that liquidity is more available under a dealer market scheme. However, it
may be that the ability of any trader to play the role of dealer allows for greater liquidity
provision.
The difficulty of characterizing the limit order book theoretically makes this welfare
question very difficult to analyze. Pagnotta (2010) presents a computational model that
nests dealer and limit order markets, allowing for a comparison of utilities. Finding that
welfare is not noticeably better by adding a dealer, he deduces that the limit order market
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does better than its historical counterpart.
The model estimated here also nests dealer and limit order markets, and is amenable
to a welfare comparison of the two. Because active traders and liquidity suppliers trade
with each other, the model is essentially a dealer market. If liquidity suppliers offer a large
number of shares early, then the informed traders they face at higher prices in the book
will likely have a strong signal about the price of the asset, decreasing expected profits.
In a monopolistic setting, a liquidity supplier bears the entirety of this loss, and so will
offer liquidity at higher prices, leading to a large bid-ask spread. However, adding liquidity
suppliers increases incentives to offer liquidity at low prices. With a large number of suppliers,
there is close to efficient liquidity provision and a small bid-ask spread. I showed earlier that
the model fit is better for n = 5 than it is for n = 2. I demonstrate here that increasing
the number of liquidity suppliers in the market raises welfare. Because a large number of
dealers is unambiguously good, and the model fits better for n = 5, data confirms Pagnotta’s
results; limit order markets are better for welfare than dealer markets.
2.6.3 Counterfactual Utilities
I calculate profitability for liquidity suppliers and certainty-equivalent utility for the active
trader. These values will be useful in considering counterfactual utilities, comparing social
welfare in dealer and limit order markets. Interested readers can find relevant calculations
in the appendix, 4.3.
I generate counterfactual markets, varying the number of liquidity suppliers n = 1, . . . , 50,
ranging from a monopoly to relative competition. Using these simulated markets, I compute
expected profits to liquidity suppliers and the certainty-equivalent utility increase for active
traders. Table 2.4 presents counterfactual estimates for five dates and times examined in the
earnings announcements section. For each example, profits to liquidity suppliers go down
as the number of competitors increases. Conversely, certainty-equivalent utility goes up for
active traders as the number of liquidity suppliers competing for their business increases.
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Comparing profits and utilities in absolute number is misleading because of the nature of
the active trader’s exponential utility. However, profits to liquidity suppliers are a transfer
of utility from the active trader, so relative changes in the sum of utilities matter. Moving
from a more monopolistic setting to a more competitive one is better for the market for this
asset. Hence, I show with data that limit order markets are more efficient than their dealer
market predecessors.
Comparing certainty-equivalent utility gain to the active trader at different points in
time, the active trader sees a much lower gain Oct. 14 late than Oct. 16 early, despite
volatility being similar, 0.5724 and 0.6888, respectively. At both points in time, active
traders are exposed to a large amount of risk in the volatility of the asset. The informedness
ratio is high Oct 14 late, 26.463, compared to 14.320 on Oct 16 early, so liquidity suppliers
are offering a less favorable supply schedule. The increased hedging active traders can do
on Oct 16 early is due to reduced asymmetric information in the market. Similarly, on
Oct. 15 late, there is an even greater gain to liquidity suppliers and active traders. Despite
volatility being relatively high, 0.4601, the informedness ratio was 16.295, and there was a
large amount of depth in the book. Many traders were posting liquidity, leading to steep
supply curves, allowing for a large amount of hedging needs to be met.
Following robustness checks, I determined that the model fit data better with n = 5 than
specifications with fewer or more liquidity suppliers.27 This number represents the oligopolis-
tic incentives liquidity suppliers face in the limit order market. The limit order market does
not operate as a duopoly, nor does it operate under perfect competition. In addition, coun-
terfactual utilities show that competition among liquidity suppliers is unambiguously good
for welfare. The model specified with n = 2 is essentially a dealer market. Moving from
this hypothetical dealer market to n = 5, the robust specification for estimating the data,
increases counterfactual utilities. Hence, data confirms Pagnotta’s result that moving from
27While there may be settings in which a value of n > 5 would be appropriate, it is clear that n is at least
larger than n = 2, evidence limit order market structure is more efficient than dealer markets.
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Table 2.4: Counterfactual Profits and Utilities
This table shows counterfactual profits to liquidity suppliers and utility to informed active
traders across varied market structures. I study here the sell side of the limit order book for
Google stock on dates October 14, 15, and 16, surrounding the 3rd quarter earnings announce-
ment by Google in 2009. The market for Google opens at 9 a.m., EST, and unless otherwise
noted, early refers 10:00 a.m., mid refers to 1:00 p.m., and late refers to estimates being made for
data at 3:30 p.m., market closing at 4:00 p.m. Liquidity suppliers are considered the uninformed
dealers while the informed active trader takes liquidity from the limit order book. The number
of suppliers is varied from 1 (monopoly) to 50 (relative competition). Total profits are listed for
liquidity suppliers and decrease with competition, whereas certainty-equivalent utility as defined
for the informed active trader increases with competing liquidity suppliers. Because profits to
liquidity suppliers are zero-sum, this is evidence that more competition, and so more liquidity
suppliers, in these markets leads to higher levels of efficiency. Bootstrap standard errors are in
parentheses.
Number of Suppliers
1 2 5 10 20 50
10/14 late suppliers 1.525 0.8029 0.3480 0.1887 0.1185 0.0691
active trader 70.043 80.275 79.311 82.383 84.483 85.287
10/15 early suppliers 27.034 11.739 4.172 2.357 1.260 0.6383
active trader 61.843 121.451 141.205 145.073 147.294 148.882
10/15 mid suppliers 29.129 11.999 3.291 1.556 0.8809 0.4941
active trader 163.773 198.182 205.612 210.075 211.387 214.921
10/15 late suppliers 134.179 49.909 25.937 20.708 16.926 14.156
active trader 1385.844 1527.734 1541.288 1574.801 1596.956 1610.083
10/16 earlya suppliers 62.334 24.417 7.341 4.339 2.437 1.245
active trader 634.427 693.385 707.728 707.093 718.011 723.144
a This time was offset by a total of two (2) fifteen minute periods to 10:30 a.m.. The bid-ask spread was too wide
to produce meaningful estimates, and I waited until a point in the day that the market was back in equilibrium.
34
dealer markets to limit order markets increases welfare.
2.7 Conclusion
I develop a method of estimating an equilibrium model of the limit order book using market
data.
As an application, I examine the market for Google around the time of an earnings an-
nouncement. The informedness ratio, a model-consistent measure of information asymmetry,
begins decreasing even before the earnings announcement. This is consistent with the notion
that some information related to the announcement was already present in the market before
the announcement itself. A second application examines the welfare implications of dealer
vs. limit order markets.
My method lends itself to a number of further applications. Initial public offerings involve
important market structure changes over time. In addition, mergers would be an interesting
phenomenon to investigate. These I leave for future research.
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Chapter 3
Corruption and Community-Driven
Development
3.1 Introduction
In 2006, donors contributed $4.5 B–19% of all donor money–to developing countries through
projects to be carried out using a bottom-up, decentralized mechanism (Lessmann and Mark-
wardt (2010)). In its idealized form, decentralized aid, or Community-Driven Development,
gives target villages the power to implement and make decisions regarding aid projects.
Projects are designed to depend on grass roots movements for their development and pro-
duction, increasing competition between bureaucrats and allowing inter-regional bidding for
project funds (see Arikan (2004)). If bureaucrats are more accountable, officials will face
difficulty in extracting rents. However, the literature finds that such an aid tool is at times
far from ideal in practice. I present a model describing a possible corrupt community-driven
development project. I offer a game theoretic representation of how targeted individuals in
a community could receive aid while capture is taking place, and what problems may exist
in the incentive structure for corrupt government agencies.
For background, I describe an example of a community-driven development aid disburse-
ment process as administered by the World Bank. This example comes from Ensminger
(2012).1 To begin with, the World Bank distributes money to the government of a devel-
1For a thorough discussion of Community-Driven Development in all its possible forms, see Dongier,
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oping country. The government establishes regional or district offices, reviewing community
proposals for aid, while also being responsible for educating villages about possible aid pro-
grams and the procedure for obtaining a project.2 Possible projects are discussed by the
villages and a proposal is approved by majority vote. Subsequently the village elects a com-
mittee which takes the proposal to the district for approval. Given authorization, project
funds are often matched to some degree3 by the village while the project committee receives
control of the account from the district for the remaining money. The committee is to leave
a balance in the donor bank account for subsequent projects. At the district and village
level these projects undergo announced monitoring by the World Bank and project donors.
Results motivate distribution of funds at the project level. Projects often involve building
construction, increasing the numbers of livestock, or improving agricultural practices.4
Community-Driven Development gives the opportunity to motivated individuals to design
and carry out their own aid projects, benefitting their own communities. While this has many
positive possible outcomes in terms of efficiency, it leaves open some questions regarding
proper implementation. Without a central authority overseeing all stages of the project, it is
unclear how much donors can affect elite control, project choice, and aid outcomes. I discuss
how typical models of corruption fail to illustrate the way malfeasance could encroach on
disbursement to intended beneficiaries.
World Bank and donor monitoring means to empower villages to address their own prob-
lems. Monitoring visits are announced and they are infrequent, but this is not any different
than a setting such as Becker and Stigler (1974).5 Success in Becker and Stigler (1974) is
Van Domelen, Ostrom, Ryan, Wakeman, Bebbington, Alkire, Esmail, and Polski (2003).
2The review of community proposals takes on several forms, as this is just one. Additionally, many CDD
projects require some educating of communities about developing aid projects.
3A variety of programs exist, but the core concept is matching funds by the village. In the case study by
Ensminger (2012), all projects require that the village raise 30% of project funds on its own, amounting to
a total of 130% of donor money (in the form of donor and village funding) withheld for the project.
4This list is by no means exhaustive. It is important to note that projects may address varying needs
within communities.
5In Becker and Stigler’s paper, the government or firm decides on an appropriate pension given the
probability of detection and the benefits of malfeasance. This reward is given to employees upon successful
completion of their tenure.
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defined as never being caught in corrupt dealings by a government, firm or other central
authority. In a decentralized aid problem, what would the central authority be? While
elite capture is by no means strictly pervasive (see Dasgupta and Beard (2007), Rao and
Ibanez (2005)), elite control of projects is (Fritzen (2007)). Elites therefore have some control
over the project’s likelihood of detection for various forms of capture (Shleifer and Vishny
(1993)). This disempowers the central authority because project details are not controlled by
donors. I thus argue that the Becker-Stigler setting, with a centralized monitoring authority,
may not best describe the incentives involved in Community-Driven Development. I model
those incentives, showing that project outcomes–some amount of aid money reaching target
individuals–are not enough to rule out elite capture.
In their seminal 1974 paper, Becker and Stigler formulated a principal-agent model for
addressing corruption. Fundamental to their model is a firm or government capable of
detecting and punishing malfeasance.6 While this framework is effective in the deterrence
of graft, petty or otherwise, it depends crucially on a central monitoring authority which
may be undermined by the decentralized nature of Community-Driven Development–because
decentralization strengthens power for local elites, it might therefore increase corruption
and cronyism (see Bardhan (2002) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)). Namely, donor
and World Bank monitoring may be ineffective in detecting malfeasance due to choices in
procurement project choice and implementation, (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).7
6Becker and Stigler model personal corruption, corruption benefitting the individual directly, as opposed
to official corruption, corruption explicitly or implicitly required by the principal (Banfield (1975)). This is
an important distinction within decentralized aid. While official corruption may be an important component
in a model of Community-Driven Development, that is beyond the scope of this paper. Banfield (1975) also
argues that project managers have incentive to reduce detection of malfeasance through coersion. However,
Rose-Ackerman (1975) focuses on market structure and bribery of bureaucrats in the government contracting
process.
7Lui (1986) produces an overlapping generations model in which as corruption becomes more common, it
becomes more difficult to detect corruption effectively. Of course, this result hinges on the assumption that
it becomes more costly to monitor as the prevalence of corruption goes up. Although, secrecy in government
decisions down to the district level likely does increase the costs of effective monitoring. Basu, Bhattacharya,
and Mishra (1992) look at corrupt officials being caught and possibly bribing the official punishing them,
what is referred to as “recursive corruption.” They find that even ineffective policies may play a role in the
deterrence of corruption. Alam (1995) looks at the countervailing actions the victims of corruption may take
to avoid losses. Alam comments, “It is time to take the victims of corruption more seriously.”
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There is a literature cautioning against ramping up CDD for these reasons. Platteau
and Gaspart (2003) and Platteau (2004) argue that the only way to prevent corruption is an
active role played by the purveyors of money.8 Similarly Lessmann and Markwardt (2010)
and Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) argue that decentralized aid works in nations that
are heavily centralized already.9 The Becker and Stigler setting does not effectively describe
decentralized aid, and asking questions about malfeasance requires a different theoretical
investigation.
Empirical work has shown that CDD projects have positive outcomes, but it is unclear
what this criterion means. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) perform four case studies in Indonesia,
but measures of effectiveness are qualitative and include no data on the amount of money
reaching targeted individuals. Rao and Ibanez (2005) obtain survey data surrounding aid
projects in Jamaica, and find that 80% of members express satisfaction with aid outcomes.
It would be difficult to determine the efficiency level to which an 80% satisfaction rate
corresponds.10
I present a model of the decentralized aid process without a central monitoring authority.
In addition, a level of project money is disbursed to targeted individuals, qualitatively in
8Specifically, Platteau and Gaspart (2003) consider community-driven development mechanisms and argue
that recent goals of ramping up CDD aid need to be tempered with a so-called Leader-Disciplining Mech-
anism. The authors argue that administrators must be patient and adhere to a sequential disbursement
procedure supported by a fraud detection mechanism to reduce capture. Platteau (2004) discusses several
methods to achieve disbursement to intended benficiaries. Platteau also highlights multilateral disbursement
mechanisms as an effective tool for reducing elite capture.
9Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) investigate empirically the effectiveness of keeping corruption at bay.
The authors find that preventing elite capture requires central monitoring of bureaucrats’ behavior in some
form. They argue that a free press is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for successful implemen-
tation of community-driven development. They find that a high degree of freedom of the press results in
decentralization counteracting corruption. Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) investigate the effectiveness of
community-driven development in centralized vs. decentralized countries and find that such aid programs
are effective in centralized nations. However, they find that decentralized aid programs are ineffective or
even harmful in decentralized countries.
10Dasgupta and Beard (2007) examine community-driven poverty alleviation projects in Indonesia for four
neighborhoods with contrasting social orders and elite control. The authors find that elite capture is not
prevalent, although elite control of projects is. Fritzen (2007) supports this work by following up in Indonesia
with a series of surveys given out to elites and project managers, and finds that projects can be influenced by
project-related accountability arrangements. Rao and Ibanez (2005) look at Jamaican social investment fund
projects and find that 80 percent of community members express satisfaction with the outcome of projects,
but highlight that better educated and better networked individuals dominate the aid process.
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agreement with evidence in Dasgupta and Beard (2007) and in Rao and Ibanez (2005).
Despite significant elite capture, the levels–as presented in example–are similar to those
found in a case study by Ensminger (2012).
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Splitting a Dollar in Aid
I model a corruptible Village-Committee-District relationship with three players. The game
involves the splitting of a dollar into three non-negative shares
mD +mC +mV = 1. (3.1)
The model discussed here presents a new ultimatum game in which players act successively
and punishment is determined by the player at the end of the line. This is related to the
three-person ultimatum games literature, specifically Oppewal and Tougareva (1992), Riedl
and Vyrastekova (2003), and Shupp, Schmitt, and Swope (2006). While the phenomenon of
an intermediary between first proposer and final receiver could be represented generally in an
”n-person” successive ultimatum game, the most basic representation requires three players.
In period 1 the District is in charge of making the first split of the dollar into mD and 1−mD.
The Committee subsequently determines the portion of 1−mD to send to the Village, mV ,
and the amount to keep mC = 1 − mD − mV . I assume that any precommitment by the
Committee and District to some sort of splitting strategy is not directly enforceable. The
Village receives utility w ∼ U [0, α] for blowing the whistle on the Committee and District,
making the decision whether to blow the whistle or not based on the amount of funds it
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receives.11 If the Village blows the whistle to the central government (subsequently HQ)12,
then HQ performs an monitoring visit of the District and the District pays c.13 The District
never deals with the village again in subsequent periods, meaning payoffs of zero for all
players forever.14 Each District deals with a certain number of Villages. I assume that there
is no outside option to working with one Village. Each District is working to the capacity of
its region. If the Village chooses not to blow the whistle, then HQ has no reason to peform
a costly monitoring visit and I assume that the District, Committee and Village receive a
continuation payoff forever. The continuation payoff is discounted by a respective discount
factor δD, δC , δV and is at the same level as the first period split.
I consider singleton actors at each level. In assuming singleton actors, I am considering
that dissention at any one of these levels is debilitating. The existence of a District, let
alone a Committee, is tenuous. HQ has full authority over each District, and the District
can approve or disapprove of any proposal a Committee makes. If individuals at each level
do not cooperate, they will falter. I leave deliberation by individual actors for further
investigation.
Considering that 0 < δV , δC , δD < 1, I have that nondegenerate equilibrium payoffs for
11Ensminger (2012) highlights the fact that whistle blowing does happen in practice. In modeling the aid
process, I am agnostic about the direct benefits to Village. There may be a variety of economic reasons for
blowing the whistle, from feeling cheated, to achieving a payoff by corrupt individuals (this is described in
Ensminger (2012)). The important facets here are that there is whistle blowing and that it is responsive to
environment.
12Here, HQ is still the corrupt government bureau I discussed above. It is important to note that in
maintaining secrecy, each level has something to lose if a level lower down makes malfeasance clear to
outsiders. This notion is highlighted in Banfield (1975).
13I could model c as the costs of maintaining secrecy or stopping whistle blowing before it gets to a
higher level than the District, however I am agnostic about the origins of c. I assume the Village has some
way to hurt the District. The punishment could be handed down by the World Bank, by a higher level of
government, by individual officials, or it could be a payoff to upset targeted individuals (as I discussed in a
footnote above).
14This assumption may seem stark. However, the District may have limited means to continue dealing
with a community (Committee and Village) following a whistle blow. While this may not describe every
project, Ensminger (2012) notes that this does happen in practice, that Villages rarely see project money
again after blowing the whistle.
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the Village, Committee, and District are,
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Details of these derivations can be found in the Appendix, sections 3.5.1, 3.5.2, and
3.5.3. It is important to note that α
(
1−δV
δV
)
represents the propensity to whistle blow by the
Village. A lower value, and the Village is more patient, and has less incentive15 to whistle
blow. A higher value, and the Village is more willing to blow the whistle, upsetting future
project implementation.
3.2.2 Equilibrium Existence
I look for the conditions such that m∗V , m∗C , m∗D all to be greater than 0.
Definition 1. A Positive Payoff Equilibrium is an equilibrium in best responses in which
m∗V , m∗C, m∗D > 0.
Theorem 1. –Existence of a Positive Payoff Equilibrium
Given that blowing the whistle benefits the Village w ∼ U [0, α], 0 < α ≤ 1, costing the
District c > 0, and the Village, Committee, and District discount future payoffs according
to 0 < δV < 1, c2+c < δC < 1, 0 < δD < 1, then there exists a positive payoff equilibrium iff
 1 + (1− δD)c(
4 + 1−δC
δC
+ 2−2δD
δD
)
 < α(1− δV
δV
)
<
 1 + (1− δD)c(
1−δC
δC
+ 2−2δD
δD
)
 . (3.5)
The proof can be found in the appendix, 3.5.4.
15Recall here that benefit, w ∼ U [0, α].
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The inequalities in (3.5) highlight an important intuition behind my equilibrium result.
To receive positive payoffs, a Village needs to be sufficiently patient (α 1−δV
δV
low enough),
but also have enough of a desire to blow the whistle (α 1−δV
δV
high enough) to hold the other
players accountable to a positive payoff equilibrium. If the Village were unable to punish or
uninterested in punishing malfeasance, the Committee would fully abuse its power, keeping
all the funds it receives from the District. The District would anticipate this and keep all
the money to itself. Conversely, if the Village were too ready to report malfeasance, the
expected continuation payoffs would be so low as to disincentivize any investment in those
future payoffs. The Committee would keep all its money, meaning the District wouldn’t
hand any down the chain.
For some Village profiles, despite elite capture of a large share of project funds, the Village
still receives a positive payoff. While several studies interpret the qualities of Community-
Driven Development and the outcomes due to elite capture, the measures of effectiveness
are coarse in nature. Dasgupta and Beard (2007) examines four neighborhood projects in
Indonesia and find that target individuals receive some level of the intended funds. But it
is unclear how much of the money achieves proper disbursement. Fritzen (2007) examines
Dasgupta and Beard’s work using multi-district surveys of those implementing the aid pro-
cess, but this lends little, if any, evidence of the exact effectiveness of aid practices. Rao
and Ibanez (2005) investigates attitudes of target households in a case study of the Jamaica
social investment fund, finding that 80% of the community expresses satisfaction with aid
outcomes.16 This, the authors claim, is evidence of limited elite capture. It may be unclear,
however, how a positive response to an aid project relates to levels of disbursement to in-
tended beneficiaries. Ensminger (2012) makes an exhaustive case study of a particular aid
project in Kenya, determining that capture is prevalent, despite some money reaching tar-
16This level is despite a significant majority of households reporting prior to implementation dissatisfaction
with possible aid projects. This is possibly further evidence that an 80% satisfaction rate may be misleading
about overall effectiveness of an aid project. Are households happy to receive any money at all? Are aid
project participants conditioned to respond positively about a project for fear of losing any future project
money? These and other possibilities may arise.
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geted individuals (and, it is argued, not in an effective manner). Dasgupta and Beard (2007)
and Rao and Ibanez (2005) argue that elite capture is mitigated by a variety of endogenous
mechanisms, contrasting heavily with the findings in Ensminger (2012). My model shows
that elite capture can exist with seemingly useful aid projects, and that these studies may be
studying the same phenomenon: noticeable portions of funds reaching target villages amidst
substantive elite capture.
I illustrate this phenomenon through an example. In my model, the propensity for a
Village to blow the whistle must be at the right level for a positive payoff equilibrium.
Assuming some relatively impatient Village and Committee (community members), a patient
District, and a penalty to the District for malfeasance,17
δV = δC =
1
2 , δD =
7
8 , c = 1
α must be between 63296 ∼
1
5 and
7
8 (as in (3.5)). Choosing α =
1
4 , it is clear from (3.2),
(3.3), and (3.4), that,
m∗V =
39
224 ∼ 18%
m∗C =
341
672 ∼ 50%
m∗D =
107
336 ∼ 32%
In the example, the community (Committee and Village together) receive 7.511 ∼ 68%
of money, while disbursement to targeted individuals remains nearly a fifth of total project
funding. These numbers approximate positive disbursement, possibly substantial enough to
be consistent with observations in Dasgupta and Beard (2007) and Rao and Ibanez (2005).
The numbers do fall in line with break downs found in Ensminger (2012). This model shows
how a positive amount of money can reach the Village without a central authority. The out-
17Patience is related to project-to-project payoffs. Projects could span several years, if not longer, so it
may be reasonable to assume that a Village or Committee discount heavily future project funds.
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comes of this model are consistent with the finding of elite capture in Bardhan (2002), and
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). While this possibility is not debilitating to Community-
Driven Development, it shows a reason for substantive donor oversight on aid projects. A
call for increased oversight is consistent with cautionary research by Lessmann and Mark-
wardt (2010) and Lessmann and Markwardt (2012) and suggestions for implementation of
community driven development found in Platteau and Gaspart (2003) and Platteau (2004).
I show through this result that while there are several mitigating factors which may endoge-
nously reduce elite capture, that success of an aid project may be too coarse a qualitative
assessment, and that the decentralized aid process makes detection of elite capture more
difficult than previously considered.
3.3 Relative patience and comparative statics
3.3.1 Village patience and whistle blowing
The Village propensity to whistle blow is described by the term α1− δV
δV
. The higher this
term is, the more willing the Village is to blow the whistle, in expectation. One might expect
that a higher propensity to blow the whistle means a greater take for the Village (as the
Committee and District attempt to keep the Village quiet). However,
∂
∂α 1−δV
δV
m∗V = −
1− δD
2δD
− 1− δC4δC < 0 (3.6)
Counterintuitively, within a positive payoff equilibrium, a Village with a higher incentive
to blow the whistle is going to command a smaller portion of funds. The intuition is clear.
With a lower α1− δV
δV
, the expected overall pie is bigger. That is, if the Village is more
patient, each player has more to benefit from in later periods, in expectation. As a Village
becomes less patient, the Committee and District are less willing to part with first period
funds because investment in continuation payoffs has a lower return.
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Considering Committee patience,
∂
∂δC
m∗C = −3
∂
∂δC
m∗V = −
3
2
∂
∂δC
m∗D = −α
(
1− δV
δV
)
3
4δ2C
< 0 (3.7)
which implies that increased Committee patience yields a lower payoff for the Committee
and a higher payoff for the Village and the District. Intuitively, the Village will receive more
in equilbrium from the Committee. Anticipating this, the District will keep more of the
dollar.
For the District,
∂
∂δD
m∗D = −2
∂
∂δD
m∗V = −2
∂
∂δD
m∗C =
c
2 − α
(
1− δV
δV
)
1
δ2D
(3.8)
which is > 0 when δD >
√
2(1− δV )α
cδV
. In other words, if 2(1− δV )α
cδV
< 1, a patient enough
District will give more money to the Committee, which in turn passes more on to the Village,
because this would mean a higher continuation payoff.
Naturally,
∂
∂c
m∗V =
∂
∂c
m∗C = −
1
2
∂
∂c
m∗D =
1− δD
4 (3.9)
a higher c results in higher payoffs for the Committee and the Village because the District
is trying to avoid paying the penalty to HQ.
Comparative statics are Summarized in Table 3.1. As can be seen in the table, a change in
propensity to whistle blow has ambiguous effects on payoffs for the Committee and District.
I show in the appendix, 3.5.5, that the more patient player gets more in equilibrium.
Within existence bounds, individual patience unambiguously helps the Village and hurts
the Committee. The District either suffers or benefits from more patience, depending on
their valuation of the continuation payoff. The District has a different problem here because
it must anticipate the choice of the Committee. However, one would expect that a more
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Table 3.1: PPE Comparative Statics
PPE Payoffs
m∗V m
∗
C m
∗
D
∂
∂α 1−δV
δV
↓ ? ?
∂
∂δC
↑ ↓ ↑
∂
∂δD
? ? ?
∂
∂c
↑ ↑ ↓
impatient party would be paid off more to keep them from, in the Committee’s case, taking
all the funds, and in the Village’s, blowing the whistle. In the Village’s case, I see that more
patience is bad for their single period payoffs. This is explained by the fact that a higher
propensity to blow the whistle means a lower expected continuation payoff and therefore
less incentive for those higher on the money chain to pass down first period funds. The
way the funds are kept from the Village depends on the relative patience of the District and
Committee.
3.4 Conclusion
Community-Driven Development is designed to improve project proposal and implementa-
tion through grass roots movement and competition among bureaucrats. A typical investi-
gation of corruption involves a firm or government agency interested in preventing employees
or officials from abusing their postions. Here I do not assume such a heirarchy, choosing to
model the process in a decentralized manner.
My model involves three players, Village, project Committe, and District, splitting a
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dollar and acting selfishly. I remain agnostic about the origins of costs targeted individuals
can impose on higher powers, but my model shows that there are parameters under which
projects could be have positive payoffs. I make the subtle but important point that detection
of elite capture could be more complicated than previously considered. Namely, project funds
could achieve disbursement to targeted individuals while implementers capture much of the
intended aid money. This means that projects could appear to be functioning (as claimed in
Dasgupta and Beard (2007), and Rao and Ibanez (2005)) while project implementers capture
a significant portion of funds (as presented in Ensminger (2012)).
My model is a start for analyzing this problem at the district level. While my description
of the Community-Driven Development aid process may not describe all settings, it gives
a feasible example for which coarse measures of project implementation effectiveness (that
money reaches targeted individuals at all) are ineffective at detecting malfeasance.
3.5 Appendix
3.5.1 V - Village
w ∼ U [0, α], 0 < α ≤ 1, 0 < δV < 1
I let the Village blow the whistle be represented by d(mV , w) = 1 and not blowing the whistle
represented by d(mV , w) = 0. As such,
uV (mV ) =

mV +
δV
1− δV mV if d(mV , w) = 0
mV + w if d(mV , w) = 1
(3.10)
A mixed strategy is dominated as follows: If mV is passed on to the Village, the choice
of Village share by Committee after 1−mD decision by District, then let σwhistle blow(w) be
the mixed strategy of blowing the whistle. Once the Village realizes w, either δV1−δV mV ≥ w
or δV1−δV mV < w. If I have the former, the Village gains the most benefit from keeping quiet;
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the latter implies the Village does better blowing the whistle. This means any optimal
σwhistle blow(w) is degenerate.
d(mV , w) =

0 if δV1−δV mV ≥ w
1 if δV1−δV mV < w
(3.11)
And the probability of the Village staying quiet must then be,18
P (d(mV , w) = 0|mV ) = δV(1− δV )αmV if mV ≤ α
(
1− δV
δV
)
(3.12)
3.5.2 C - Committee
The Committee has discount factor 0 < δC < 1 and receives 1 −mD from the District and
decides how to split it with the Village. Considering (3.12), the utility to the committee for
different choices of mV are,
uC(mD,mV , δC) = 1−mD −mV + (1−mD −mV ) δC1− δC
δV
1−δV mV
α
(3.13)
with F.O.C.
∂
∂mV
uC(mD,mV , δC) = −1 + δCδV(1− δC)(1− δV )α(1−mD − 2mV ) (3.14)
with a necessary negative second derivative,
∂2
∂m2V
uC(mD,mV , δC) = − 2δCδV(1− δC)(1− δV )α < 0 (3.15)
18It is never beneficial to the Committee to give the Village more than α
(
1−δV
δV
)
. It is not subgame
perfect to offer the Village anything more. Nash equilibrium would require that giving the Village more than
α
(
1−δV
δV
)
somehow hurts the District. If the Village receives mV ≥ α
(
1−δV
δV
)
, d(mV , w) = 0 by definition,
so there would be no effect of increasing the Village’s share.
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Equation (3.14) gives,
m∗V =
1
2 −
mD
2 −
(1− δC)(1− δV )α
2δCδV
if 0 < m∗V <
1− δV
δV
α. (3.16)
3.5.3 D - District
The District has discount factor 0 < δD < 1. The District’s decision becomes clear when
I backward induct from the decisions of the Village and the Committee. Given their best
response behavior, the District determines 1−mD factoring in the tradeoff between the payoff
of mD now and in continuation, given the probability that Village chooses d(mV , δV ) = 0,
and the payment to HQ, c > 0, if the Village does blow the whistle. Incorporating (3.16),
uD = mD +mD
δD
1− δD
δV
(1− δV )αm
∗
V − δDc
[
1− δV(1− δV )αm
∗
V
]
(3.17)
= mD +mD
δD
1− δD
δV
(1− δV )α
(
1
2 −
mD
2 −
(1− δC)(1− δV )α
2δCδV
)
− (3.18)
δDc
[
1− δV(1− δV )α
(
1
2 −
mD
2 −
(1− δC)(1− δV )α
2δCδV
)]
F.O.C.,
∂
∂mD
uD = 1− δDc δV2(1− δV )α +
(
δD
1− δD
)(
δV
2(1− δV )α
)[
1− 2mD −
(
(1− δC)(1− δV )α
δCδV
)]
(3.19)
and necessary negative second derivative,
∂2
∂m2D
= −
(
δD
1− δD
)(
δV
(1− δV )α
)
< 0 (3.20)
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=⇒ m∗D =
1
2 −
(
1− δD
2
)
c+ α
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δD
δD
)
− α
(
1− δV
δV
)
1
2
(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.21)
From (3.1), substituting in m∗D to (3.16),
m∗V =
1
4 +
(
1− δD
4
)
c− α
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δD
2δD
)
− α
(
1− δV
δV
)
1
4
(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.22)
m∗C =
1
4 +
(
1− δD
4
)
c− α
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δD
2δD
)
+ α
(
1− δV
δV
)
3
4
(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.23)
3.5.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. –Existence of a Positive Payoff Equilibrium
Given that blowing the whistle benefits the Village w ∼ U [0, α], 0 < α ≤ 1, costing the
District c > 0, and the Village, Committee, and District discount future payoffs according to
0 < δV < 1, c2+c < δC < 1, 0 < δD < 1, then there exists a positve payoff equilibrium iff
 1 + (1− δD)c(
4 + 1−δC
δC
+ 2−2δD
δD
)
 < α(1− δV
δV
)
<
 1 + (1− δD)c(
1−δC
δC
+ 2−2δD
δD
)
 . (3.24)
Proof. For a postive payoff equilibrium to exist, I need m∗V , m∗C , m∗D to be equilibrium values
chosen, I need m∗V , m∗C , m∗D > 0 and importantly,
m∗V < α
(
1− δV
δV
)
19 (3.25)
m∗V and m∗D solve the F.O.C. for the Committee and the District, respectively. 0 < δV , δC <
19Giving any more to the Village would be of no benefit to the Committee. If the Committee is giving the
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1 is given, so this ensures that
∂2
∂m2V
uC(mD,mV , δC) = − 2δCδV(1− δC)(1− δV )α < 0, showing m
∗
V is the optimum for the Com-
mittee.
0 < δD < 1 as well, meaning
∂2
∂m2D
= −
(
δD
1− δD
)(
δV
(1− δV )α
)
< 0
A positive payoff equilibrium exists. From definition 1, equilibrium values from (3.21), (3.22),
(3.23), m∗V ,m∗C ,m∗D > 0. Clearly, m∗C > m∗V , so the condition on m∗C is not binding.
Considering the condition for the District, (3.21), there are three cases
1. δD >
2δC
1 + δC
⇐⇒
(
1− δC
δC
− 21− δD
δD
)
> 0
=⇒ α
(
1− δV
δV
)
<
1− (1− δD)c(
1−δC
δC
− 21−δD
δD
) (3.26)
2. δD <
2δC
1 + δC
⇐⇒
(
1− δC
δC
− 2− 2δD
δD
)
< 0
=⇒ α
(
1− δV
δV
)
>
1− (1− δD)c(
1−δC
δC
− 2−2δD
δD
) (3.27)
However, c ≤ 1 =⇒ 1− (1− δD)c > 0 ∀δD ∈ (0, 1), so this inequality becomes trivial
as the RHS is negative.
3. δD =
2δC
1 + δC
=⇒
(
1− δC
δC
− 2− 2δD
δD
)
= 0
This inequality states 0 < 1− (1− δD)c, something already implied by c ≤ 1
Village exactly α1− δV
δV
, then I have that the Committee is willing to incur no potential for whistle blowing,
meaning a degenerate solution on the boundary.
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Only case 1 remains relevant. Considering bounds on δC ,
c
2 + c < δC ⇐⇒ c− δCc < 2δC
⇐⇒
(
1− δC
δC
)
c < 2
⇐⇒
(
1− δC
δC
)
(1− δD)c < 2
(
1− δD
δD
)
⇐⇒ 1 + (1− δD)c(1− δC
δC
+ 2− 2δD
δD
) < 1− (1− δD)c(1− δC
δC
− 2− 2δD
δD
) (3.28)
It can be shown from the conditions for the Village, from (3.22) and (3.25), respectively,
1
4 +
1
4(1− δD)c >
1
2α
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δD
δD
)
+ 14
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.29)
1
4 +
1
4(1− δD)c > α
(
1− δV
δV
)
+ 12α
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δD
δD
)
+ 14
(
1− δV
δV
)(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.30)
Together, (3.29) and (3.30) are,
 1 + (1− δD)c(
4 + 1−δC
δC
+ 2−2δD
δD
)
 < α(1− δV
δV
)
<
 1 + (1− δD)c(
1−δC
δC
+ 2−2δD
δD
)
 . (3.31)
This inequality, (3.26), and (3.28) show that the District constraint is non-binding.
3.5.5 Comparative Statics
It depends on relative patience whether the Committee, the District, or both short a more
impatient Village.
∂
∂α 1−δV
δV
m∗C = −
1
2
(
1− δD
δD
)
+ 34
(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.32)
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which is > 0 when 34
(
1− δC
δC
)
>
1
2
(
1− δD
δD
)
=⇒ δD > 2δC3− δC
∂
∂α 1−δV
δV
m∗D =
1− δD
δD
− 12
(
1− δC
δC
)
(3.33)
which is > 0 when 1− δD
δD
>
1
2
(
1− δC
δC
)
=⇒ δD < 2δC1 + δC , which is impossible if δD >
δC
(1− δC)c , a possibility in case 1 of the
equilibrium existence, meaning in such cases, the partial derivative is always negative.
This means that higher α 1−δV
δV
has a positive effect only when the District is markedly
more patient than the Committee. As long as Committee patience is sufficiently lower than
that of the District, the District must take it into account when making the 1−mD and mD
split. An impatient Committee means that the District must dispense more funds to keep
the Village share at an optimum for reducing costs and increasing continuation payoffs, as
the Committee will be more apt to take advantage of an increased α 1−δV
δV
–investing less in
the future and taking more now.
On the other hand, if the District is not sufficiently more patient, the effect goes the other
way and the District takes more of the funds in the first place, knowing the Committee will
appease the Village. I have a of patience game played by the District and the Committee.
With a smaller continuation payoff in expectation, Committee and District may be less
willing to invest in the future, resulting in a lower first period payoff for the Village.
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Chapter 4
Econometrics and Computation in
Market Microstructure Models
4.1 Introduction
Here I present computational and econometric contributions to study of market microstruc-
ture models. These methods were used in the case study of Google surrounding an earnings
announcement in Chapter 2. This includes setting up the liquidity supplier problem and
equilibrium among those suppliers. Following, I describe the analytical forms for computing
certainty-equivalent utilities for the informed trader, which allows one to compute certainty-
equivalent utilties. Next, I present my recursive algorithm. The recursive algorithm allows
a researcher to compute supply function equilibria between several liquidity suppliers. I
conclude with a description of Indirect Inference while outlining what sets my use of the
method apart.
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Figure 4.1: October 14, 2009 NASDAQ Totalview-ITCH feed
4.1.1 Price Evolution surrounding EA by Google
4.2 Liquidity Suppliers and the Optimal Supply Prob-
lem
Beginning with the utility of offering shares,
uL(pr, Sr−1, sir, s−ir ) =
Eα,,I
[
sir1{Sr−1+sir+s−ir ≤q}(pr − v) +
sir
sir + s−ir
(q − Sr−1)1{Sr−1<q<Sr−1+sir+s−ir }(pr − v)
]
(4.1)
If Sr−1+sir+s−ir ≤ q, then following the boundary conditions,
α− pr+1
γσ2
−I ≤ Sr−1+sir+s−ir ≤
α− pr
γσ2
−I, or Sr−1+sir+s−ir <
α− pr+1
γσ2
−I. The condition Sr−1 < q < Sr−1+sir+s−ir , results
in an interior solution, so q = α− pr
γσ2
−I, so I have that Sr−1 < α− pr
γσ2
−I < Sr−1 +sir +s−ir .
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Figure 4.2: October 15, 2009 NASDAQ Totalview-ITCH feed
Because  is not correlated with I or α, I replace v with α. I can see that (4.1) is equal to,
sirE1{Sr−1+sir+s−ir ≤α−prγσ2 −I}(pr − α)+
sir
sir + s−ir
E1{
Sr−1<α−pr
γσ2
−I<Sr−1+sir+s−ir
}(pr − α)
(
α− pr
γσ2
− I − Sr−1
)
(4.2)
If I let φα(x) = 1√2piσα e
− 12(x−µασα )
2
and φI(x) = 1√2piσI e
− 12
(
x−µI
σI
)2
be the pdf s of α and I, then
(4.2) is,
sir
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr
(pr − α)φI(I)φα(α)dαdI+
sir
sir + s−ir
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr
γσ2 (Sr−1+I)+pr
[
α− pr
γσ2
− I − Sr−1
]
(pr − α)φI(I)φα(α)dαdI (4.3)
And to find the optimal liquidity provision at each price pr, a liquidity supplier chooses sir
such that (4.3) is maximized. I find a first order condition, and the derivative of (4.3) with
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Figure 4.3: October 16, 2009 NASDAQ Totalview-ITCH feed
respect to sir is,
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr
(pr − α)φI(I)φα(α)dαdI
+ γσ2 sir
∫ ∞
−∞
γσ2 (Sr−1 + sir + s−ir + I)φα(γσ2 (Sr−1 + sir + s−ir + I) + pr)φI(I)dI
+ s
−i
r
(sir + s−ir )2
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr
γσ2 (Sr−1+I)+pr
[
α− pr
γσ2
− I − Sr−1
]
(pr − α)φI(I)φα(α)dαdI
−γσ2
sir
sir + s−ir
∫ ∞
−∞
[
sir + s−ir
]
γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)φα(γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr)φI(I)dI
(4.4)
Which reduces to,
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr
(pr − α)φI(I)φα(α)dαdI
+ s
−i
r
(sir + s−ir )2
∫ ∞
−∞
φI(I)
∫ γσ2 (Sr−1+sir+s−ir +I)+pr
γσ2 (Sr−1+I)+pr
[
α− pr
γσ2
− I − Sr−1
]
(pr − α)φα(α)dαdI
(4.5)
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and that makes my second derivative
γσ2
∫ ∞
−∞
γσ2 (Sr−1 + sir + s−ir + I)φα(γσ2 (Sr−1 + sir + s−ir + I) + pr)φI(I)dI
+ 2s
−i
r
(sir + s−ir )2
∫ ∞
−∞
γσ2 (Sr−1 + sir + s−ir + I)φI(I)φα(γσ2 (Sr−1 + sir + s−ir + I) + pr)dI (4.6)
4.3 Counterfactual Utilities
I look at certainty-equivalent utility for the active trader, summed up over the different
ranges of q, the number of shares the active trader chooses to buy. From these utilities I
subtract utility from inventory holdings, as a baseline.
Different types of traders are categorized into the same cases as they are in other cal-
culations, but I compute the optimal choice over orders here. I consider a supply schedule
S = {S1, . . . , SM}, and P = {p1, . . . , pM} given.
Case 1: pr is s.t. Sr−1 < q < Sr
q = α− pr
γσ2
− I (4.7)
Case 2: q = Sr
α− pr+1
γσ2
− I < q < α− pr
γσ2
− I (4.8)
I also consider that the active trader is trying to maximize −e−γW where W is wealth,
from equation (2.7). This is equivalent to maximizing E[W |α, I] + γ2V [W |α, I] = (q+ I)α−∑M
r=1 max{0,min{q, Sr} − Sr−1}pr − γ2 (q + I)2σ2 . To find the average certainty-equivalent
utility change for active traders, I must integrate over the spaces of α and I, taking into
account latent supply S0. Presented are the equations for M and all other r = 1, . . . ,M − 1
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simultaneously. Calculating the counterfactual utility involves taking,
(q + I)α−
M∑
r=1
max{0,min{q, Sr} − Sr−1}pr − γ2 (q + I)
2σ2 (4.9)
and summing over the the range of q.
Expected utility for those traders choosing to take liquidity at price pM is,
Eα,I
{
1{SM≤α−pM
γσ2
−I}
[
α(SM + I)− γσ
2

2 (SM + I)
2 −
M∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0
]
+1{SM−1<α−pM
γσ2
−I<SM}
×
α(α− pM
γσ2
)
− γσ
2

2
(
α− pM
γσ2
)2
−
M−1∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0 − pM
(
α− pM
γσ2
− I − SM−1
)
(4.10)
and for traders taking more liquidity than at price pr,
Eα,I
{
1{α−pr
γσ2
−I≤Sr≤α−pr
γσ2
−I}
[
α(Sr + I)− γσ
2

2 (Sr + I)
2 −
r∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0
]
+1{Sr−1<α−pr
γσ2
−I<Sr}
×
α(α− pr
γσ2
)
− γσ
2

2
(
α− pr
γσ2
)2
−
r−1∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0 − pr
(
α− pr
γσ2
− I − Sr−1
) (4.11)
I sum up the above for pM and p1, . . . , pM−1, respectively, then I add utility from latent
supply,
Eα,I
1{0≤α−p1γσ2 −I≤S0}
α(α− p1
γσ2
)
− γσ
2

2
(
α− p1
γσ2
)2
− p1
(
α− p1
γσ2
− I
) (4.12)
while subtracting utility of original endowment,
Eα,I
{
1{0≤α−p1
γσ2
−I}
[
αI − γσ
2

2 I
2
]}
(4.13)
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Whereas disregarding utility from latent supply means ignoring (4.12) and (4.13) and sub-
tracting
Eα,I
{
1{S0≤α−p1
γσ2
−I}
[
α(S0 + I)− γσ
2

2 (S0 + I)
2 − p1S0
]}
. (4.14)
These give us respectively, in integral form,
∫ ∞
γσ2 (SM+I)+pM
∫ ∞
−∞
[
α(SM + I)− γσ
2

2 (SM + I)
2 −
M∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0
]
φα(α)φI(I)dIdα
+
∫ γσ2 (SM+I)+pM
γσ2 (SM−1+I)+pM
∫ ∞
−∞
α(α− pM
γσ2
)
− γσ
2

2
(
α− pM
γσ2
)2
−
M−1∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0 − pM
(
α− pM
γσ2
− I − SM−1
)]
φα(α)φI(I)dIdα (4.15)
∫ γσ2 (Sr+I)+pr+1
γσ2 (Sr+I)+pr
∫ ∞
−∞
[
α(Sr + I)− γσ
2

2 (Sr + I)
2 −
r∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0
]
φα(α)φI(I)dIdα
+
∫ γσ2 (Sr+I)+pr
γσ2 (SM−1+I)+pr
∫ ∞
−∞
α(α− pr
γσ2
)
− γσ
2

2
(
α− pr
γσ2
)2
−
M−1∑
k=1
skpk − p1S0 − pr
(
α− pr
γσ2
− I − Sr−1
)]
φα(α)φI(I)dIdα (4.16)
∫ γσ2 (S0+I)+p1
γσ2 I+p1
∫ ∞
−∞
α(α− p1
γσ2
)
− γσ
2

2
(
α− p1
γσ2
)2
− p1
(
α− p1
γσ2
− I
)φα(α)φI(I)dIdα
(4.17)
∫ ∞
γσ2 I+p1
∫ ∞
−∞
[
αI − γσ
2

2 I
2
]
φα(α)φI(I)dIdα (4.18)
61∫ ∞
γσ2 (S0+I)+p1
∫ ∞
−∞
[
α(S0 + I)− γσ
2

2 (S0 + I)
2 − p1S0
]
φα(α)φI(I)dIdα. (4.19)
4.4 Solving for Equilibrium, detail
For an n player symmetric equilibrium, I start at the highest price, pM and work backward.
Given existing supply SM−1, the optimal supply solves the F.O.C. given in (4.5) where
r = M , and s−iM = (n − 1)siM . While it is possible that a F.O.C. will not be reached, my
computational methods avoid this. If the algorithm reaches the boundary at 0, naturally
the liquidity supplier offers 0 shares. If, however, the boundary is at the computed supply
matrix maximum, then the matrix is expanded and I restart the entire process. This ensures
that liquidity is determined endogenously in the model. I call optimal supply for individual
i at M , si∗M . Finding this value for all possible SM−1 and generating the value function at
that price and quantity, V (pM , SM−1) ≡ u(pM , SM−1, si∗M , (n − 1)si∗M), I can then solve for
si∗M−1 using (4.5) added to the derivative of V (pM−1, SM−2 +n ·siM−1) for all SM−2, generating
V (pM−1, SM−2) ≡ u(pM−1, SM−2, si∗M−1, (n−1)si∗M−1)+V (pM , SM−2+n·si∗M−1(q),M). Working
backward from M − 2 to 1, I find a symmetric equilibrium discrete price supply function for
all i. The function is in the form of a supply matrix.
Constructing a supply curve from a supply matrix involves interpolation. I begin with
latent supply S0 and compute optimal response in symmetric equilibrium at p1. Moving
forward, taking into account supply S1, the optimal response at p2 is computed. This
process continues successively to pM . My interpolation tool is a piecewise cubic hermite
interpolating polynomial.
From the lowest ask price, I assume a level of latent supply, S0, present in the book
before the best ask, just below the best ask. This is to accommodate a variety of things.
First of all, the model is made for one side of the market. While a story about institutional
and active traders is fitting, it is restrictive. In response, I might see some spillover from
the buy side of the market with active traders posting quickly executable liquidity. Second,
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there may be some impatient liquidity suppliers who do not play as part of an equilibrium
that looks like what I consider here. Third, there are hidden orders present in the market
at many points in time. While it is difficult or impossible to recreate these hidden orders
as econometrician, I can allow for some liquidity to be hidden in the form of latent supply.
I calculate the optimal supply schedule at each latent supply and interpolating according
to calculated optimal values walking up the book. This brings us to the architecture of the
supply matrix. Because of interpolation methods, I must have a bound on total aggregate
supply. In addition, I need a delimeter over this space to give us a finite number of operations.
In my calculations, I define limiting supply endogenously in my procedure so as to always
reach a F.O.C. I call this S¯, representing the maximum liquidity that can be offered by a
single trader at each of the M prices, n · S¯ for all. The procedure is illustrated in figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Supply Matrix Procedure
prices
p0, p1, p2, . . . , pM
S0
SM−1
supply
sM−1
Sim
ulate
optim
alsupply
Backward induct and interpolate
1
2
3
Selection of lowest offer price and highest offer price is not arbitrary. The lowest price
is determined by the bid-ask spread. The highest offer price is a point at which offering
shares is no longer profitably meaningful, as discussed above. One might consider a market
setting in which offering liquidity at any high price, no matter how high, would be profitable.
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However, those outcomes are improbable and economically irrelevant.
4.5 Indirect Inference Method, Proofs, and Asymp-
totic Normality
Here I outline in more detail my implementation of Indirect Inference in finding parameter
estimates.
Over the course of the trading week, and even within the trading day, the composition
of the market for a single asset changes. An individual instance of an order book tells
us about a particular point in time. However, executions, limit orders, and cancellations
can all change the shape of the order book. The same parameters could describe books
with very different shapes, depending on the prices traders choose to offer liquidity. Hence,
several different instances of the order book around the same point in time look different,
but tell the same economic story. Additionally, placing or removing a single order does
not immediately dissipate market conditions. I consider the order book from time Ti to Tj.
I want to find θ = {σα, σ, µI , σI , σS0}–refer to Table 2.1 for parameter definitions–which
describes equilibrium supply schedules over that period of time.
I look at a period of time (Ti, Tj), where 4 ≡ Tj − Ti. I take K order book samples
t1, t2, . . . , tk, . . . , tK , each of size L, where tk ≡ Ti + 4K+1k. Keeping in mind that total depth
is M , a single supply curve is (S`k, P `k) ≡ ([S`k,1, S`k,2, . . . , S`k,M ], [p`k,1, p`k,2, . . . , p`k,M ]) for each
sample, k = 1, . . . , K and all instances of the order book within each sample, ` = 1, . . . , L.
I introduce a pseudo-model for supply,
S`k,m = g(p`k,m) + ν`k,m, ν`k,m ∼ IID(0, σ2ν) (4.20)
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and I assume
S`k,m = β1 + β2p`k,m + β3p` 2k,m + β4log(p`k,m) + ν`k,m + η`k,m, η`k,m ∼ IID(0, σ2η) (4.21)
so, given
A 1. E(η`k,m|ν`k,m, p`k,m) = 0
S`k,m ' β1 + β2p`k,m + β3p` 2k,m + β4log(p`k,m) + η`k,m (4.22)
or in matrix notation
SLk = XLk βk + ηLk , ηLk ∼ IID(0, σ2ηI) (4.23)
where SLk ≡ [S1k,1, S1k,2, . . . , S1k,M , S2k,1, . . . , SLk,M ]′, XLk ≡ [1 PLk PLk 2 log(PLk )],
PLk ≡ [p1k,1, p1k,2, . . . , p1k,M , p2k,1, . . . , pLk,M ]′, and ηLk ≡ [η1k,1, η1k,2, . . . , η1k,M , η2k,1, . . . , ηLk,M ]′. My
criterion is that of reducing the sum of squared residuals,
max
β∈B
Ck,L(SLk , PLk , β) ≡ max
β∈B
−
L∑
`=1
M∑
m=1
(s`k,m − x`k,mβ)2. (4.24)
I assume this criterion tends asymptotically to a limit,
A 2. limL→∞Ck,L(SLk , Pk, β) = Ck,∞(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0, β)
I assume that the limit criterion is continuous in β and has a unique maximum,
A 3. βk,∞ ≡ arg max
β∈B
Ck,∞(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0, β)
I use the ordinary least squares estimator, βˆ(SLk , PLk ) = [XL′k XLk ]−1XL′k SLk . Because
prices are bounded, and each element of XLk is a continuous function of price, ∃ vector c s.t.
E x`k,mx
`
k,m
′ = c, ∀`, m. Here x`k,m ≡ [1 p`k,m p` 2k,m log(p`k,m)]. By the law of large numbers,
1
L
(XL′k XLk )→ c and so, plim
L→∞
1
L
(XL′k XL′k ) = SXL′k XLk exists.
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From A 1, E(η`k,m|x`k,m) = 0, and therefore,
plim
L→∞
1
L
XL′k η
L
k = plim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
`=1
M∑
m=1
x`′k,mη
`
k,m = 0 (4.25)
This gives us that βˆk = βˆ(SLk , PLk ) is a consistent estimator of βk,∞.
I introduce the binding function from Gourie´roux, Monfort, and Renault (1993),
b(Q,Pk,∞, θ) ≡ arg max
β∈B
C∞(Q,Pk,∞, θ, β) (4.26)
The binding function links the auxiliary parameters of the pseudo-model with the parameters
of the true model. I have
βk,∞ = b(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0) (4.27)
The binding function is analytically intractable. I find it numerically, however. For a θ,
P¯Lk ≡ 1L
∑L
`=1 P
`
k , X¯k ≡ [1 P¯Lk P¯L 2k log(P¯Lk )] given, I consider Λ supply curves, S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ),
λ = 1, . . . ,Λ, generated from drawings of latent supply S0. Latent supply represents noisy
liquidity supply which may be some spillover from the other side of the order book, a few
impatient suppliers, or hidden orders. S0 is drawn from a truncated normal distribution with
mean calibrated to the empirical supply curves, and variance σ2S0 . From the supply matrix
determined by θ and each draw of Sλ0 , θ = 1, . . . ,Λ, I interpolate to find the respective supply
curve, S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ). For each curve I can find the respective estimates solving,
max
β∈B
Ck,L(S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ), P¯Lk , β) (4.28)
for which I consider the OLS estimate
β˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ) = [X¯L′k X¯Lk ]−1X¯L′k S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ). (4.29)
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I assume that the vector P¯Lk reaches asymptotically the population prices from sample k.
A 4. lim
L→∞
P¯Lk = Pk,∞
And so, I define lim
L→∞
X¯Lk = Xk,∞. This means that as L tends to infinity,
this solution tends toward β˜λ(θ, Pk,∞) = [X ′k,∞Xk,∞]−1X ′k,∞S˜λ(θ, Pk,∞), which solves
max
β∈B
C∞(Q,Pk,∞, θ, β). Therefore,
lim
L→∞
β˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ) = b(Q,Pk,∞, θ) (4.30)
and is therefore a consistent functional estimator of the binding function. I define the
following,
bK(θ) ≡ [b(Q,P1,∞, θ); b(Q,P2,∞, θ), . . . , b(Q,PK,∞, θ)] (4.31)
βˆLK ≡ [βˆ(SL1 , PL1 ); βˆ(SL2 , PL2 ); . . . ; βˆ(SLK , PLK)] (4.32)
β˜λ,LK (θ) ≡ [β˜λ(θ, P¯L1 ); β˜λ(θ, P¯L2 ); . . . ; β˜λ(θ, P¯LK)] (4.33)
And make the assumptions
A 5. P¯Lk 6= P¯Lj , ∀ j 6= k
A 6. X¯L′k
∂S˜λ
∂θ′
(θ0, P¯Lk ) has full column rank, ∀ k = 1, . . . , K.
Claim 2. For number of samples K ≥ |θ||β| ,
∂bK
∂θ′
(θ0) is of full column rank.
Proof. X¯L′1
∂S˜λ
∂θ′
(θ0, P¯L1 ) has full column rank. It is therefore clear that
β˜λ(θ0, P¯L1 ) = [X¯L′1 X¯L1 ]−1X¯L′1 S˜λ(θ0, P¯L1 ) has full column rank. Because lim
L→∞
β˜λ(θ0, P¯L1 ) =
b(Q,P1,∞, θ0),
∂b
∂θ′
(Q,P1,∞, θ0) is also of full column rank. The same is true for
∂b
∂θ′
(Q,Pk,∞, θ0) for k = 2, . . . , K. Each matrix of derivatives is independent of all oth-
ers because of assumption 5. I stack up binding functions on top of each other, and because
K ≥ |θ||β| , I get a matrix of full column rank. This matrix is contained in
∂bK
∂θ′
(θ0), so it is of
full column rank.
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Using both pseudo-model objects, (4.32) and (4.33), the Indirect Inference estimator,
θˆΛ,LK optimizes the following criterion
θˆΛ,LK ≡ min
θ∈Θ
βˆLK − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,LK (θ)
′Ω
βˆLK − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,LK (θ)
 (4.34)
Proposition 3. Under assumptions 1–6, θˆΛ,LK is a consistent estimator of θ0
Proof. The F.O.C. are
 1
Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
∂β˜λ,L′K
∂θ
(θˆΛ,LK )
Ω
βˆLK − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,L(θˆΛ,LK )
 = 0 (4.35)
 1
Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
∂β˜λ,L′K
∂θ
(θˆΛ,LK )
Ω
βˆLK − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,L(θ0)− 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
∂β˜λ,LK
∂θ′
(θ0)[θˆΛ,LK − θ0]
 ' 0 (4.36)
√
L(θˆΛ,LK − θ0) '
[
∂b′K
∂θ
(θ0)Ω
∂bK
∂θ′
(θ0)
]−1
∂b′K
∂θ
(θ0)Ω
√
L
βˆLK − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,L(θ0)
 (4.37)
Because βˆLK and 1Λ
∑Λ
λ=1 β˜
λ,L(θˆΛ,LK ) are both consistent estimators of βk,∞, the estimator is
consistent.
I also show asymptotic normality of the estimator.
A 7. ∀ k and λ, plim
L→∞
∂2Ck,L
∂β ∂β′
(S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ), P¯Lk , β0) =
∂2Ck,∞
∂β ∂β′
(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0, β0)
Asymptotically, by assumption 7 and viewing SLk and PLk as simulations, so ∀ k,
∂Ck,L
∂β
(SLk , PLk , βˆ(SLk , PLk )) = 0 (4.38)
√
L
∂Ck,L
∂β
(SLk , PLk , βk,∞) +
∂2Ck,L
∂β ∂β′
(SLk , PLk , βk,∞)
√
L(βˆ(SLk , PLk )− βk,∞) ' 0 (4.39)
√
L(βˆ(SLk , PLk )− βk,∞) ' −
∂2Ck,∞
∂β ∂β′
(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0, βk,∞)
√
L
∂Ck,L
∂β
(SLk , PLk , βk,∞) (4.40)
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By a similar argument,
√
L(β˜λ(θ, P¯Lk )− βk,∞) ' −
∂2Ck,∞
∂β ∂β′
(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0, βk,∞)
√
L
∂Ck,L
∂β
(S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ), P¯Lk , βk,∞)
(4.41)
By 4.40 and 4.41, I have that,
√
L
βˆLk (SLk , PLk )− 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,L(θ0, P¯Lk )
 ' −∂2Ck,∞
∂β ∂β′
(Q0, Pk,∞, θ0, βk,∞)
×
√L∂Ck,L
∂β
(SLk , PLk , βk,∞)−
√
L
1
Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
∂Ck,L
∂β
(S˜λ(θ, P¯Lk ), P¯Lk , βk,∞)
 (4.42)
Therefore, this difference is asymptotically normal with zero mean. Therefore the difference
in stacks,
√
L
βˆLK − 1Λ
Λ∑
λ=1
β˜λ,L(θ0)
 (4.43)
is also asymptotically normal with zero mean.
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